Showing posts with label Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Show all posts

Sunday, July 24, 2011

BORROWERS BEWARE! THE FORMS ARE STILL INCREDIBLY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND.

THE ESSENCE OF TILA: BORROWER’S BILL OF RIGHTS

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EDITOR’S ANALYSIS: There is a reason why TILA, RESPA and HOEPA were enacted into law. The central theme, as clearly stated in a recent seminar led by lawyers for the banks, is to provide the consumer with a credible and understandable method of deciding between two or more potential loan offerings. The reason for these Federal Laws is to make certain that the borrower is given the information he/she needs to decide whether they want Deal A or Deal B — or none of the above.
These laws worked fairly well until wall Street stepped into the lending scenario with the illusion of securitization. The result was that the “disclosure documents” lied to the borrower. These documents took away the possibility of deciding between one loan or another and one lender or another because they intentionally misstated the identity of the lender in table-funded loans, which are identified by TILA and Reg Z as presumptively predatory loans.
The reason they are predatory is because a table-funded loan (funds and terms coming from an unidentified third party) actually tricks the borrower into thinking he/she knows the lender, thus eliminating the possibility for the borrower to reject the real lender.
The disclosure statements are also supposed to tell the borrower who is getting paid in their loan transaction and how much they are getting paid. Once again, the “disclosure” documents straight out lie to the borrower, by withholding vital information about the securitization scheme, without which the “lender” at the table would never have offered the loan.
If the securitization scheme was not in place at the time of the loan, the lender identified at closing would have had to assume risk, putting the loan on its financial statements as an asset (loan receivable) along with an entry for “reserve for bad debt”on the liability side of the balance sheet.
Of course it is easy to see why this disclosure was not made. Promises were made to the creditor (investor who advanced funds for a bogus mortgage-backed bond) including insurance, servicer obligations to continue payments, credit default swaps, and cross collateralization would have informed the borrower that the creditor was not getting the note they were signing.
The investors (I.E., THE REAL LENDER/CREDITORS) were getting a bond that included multiple sources of revenue to reduce the risk of non-payment from any of the parties who promised to pay. The borrowers would have learned that even if they made their payments on time, they could still be part of a pool that a Master Servicer would declare was in default or was subject to write-down, thus triggering payments from third parties.
The investment banks of course need to hide this information from borrowers who might be more likely to stop paying if they knew there were third party sources from which payments could be made. Any lawyer who knew these facts would have told them that it would be pretty difficult to declare the borrower in default when so many other people were obligated to pay for varying reasons that were not necessarily ties to whether the borrower made payments.
The robo-signing frenzy that ensued was a cover-up for obviously defective notes and mortgages that did not describe the actual transaction that took place — a single transaction in which investors advanced the money and borrowers received part of it, with the rest going to a myriad of third party players who were trading hedges, insurance and bets on the value of the mortgage bonds. Whether the homeowner actually made payments was and is almost irrelevant to the obligation of others (AIG, servicers et al) to make payments to the creditor either against principal, interest or both.
Nobody wanted the borrower to know what was really going on. But that is exactly what TILA, RESPA and HOEPA were all about — requiring the real lenders to show themselves, identify themselves, and disclose the identities of all the intermediary parties who were making money as a result of the money transaction between the investor and the homeowner.
The effect of this line of reasoning on RESCISSION remedies both under TILA (or HOEPA) is huge. The three day window is a “buyer’s remorse” window of opportunity where the borrower can reverse the transaction, no questions asked. If they go beyond the three-day window they have three years to cite a material violation and then give notice of rescission. Lenders want the courts to construe it as a claim of rescission but congress specifically worded the statute leaving it entirely within the hands of the homeowner and shifting the burden of the challenge to the “lender” who would be required to file a lawsuit (declaratory action) pleading and proving why the borrower should not be allowed to rescind.
The importance of rescission under TILA is that it gives the borrower the power to disconnect the mortgage lien from the property leaving the obligation unsecured. If there is a balance due from homeowner to “lender”, after the “lender” has returned all documents, filed the satisfaction (although Reg Z  says that the mortgage is terminated by operation of law upon sending of the notice to rescind) then the homeowner is obligated to tender a payment plan.
The failure to properly disclose the parties and terms and the outright lying that went on at nearly every closing, provides a window of opportunity to invoke the 3 day rule that starts from the date the disclosure is made. At this point, even with millions of foreclosures, the pretender lenders have still not identified the real lender or creditor and still have withheld the full accounting for the payments received by or on behalf of the real lenders or creditors. So, it would seem that the three-day right of rescission has not even begin to run in nearly all cases.
Now the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has inherited this problem and is charged withe responsibility of  making certain that at least future transactions comply with the law. But the future transactions include satisfactions, payoffs, foreclosures etc., all of which are predicated upon a false foundation of liens that were never perfected, defective and incurable. Politically it is a third rail to suggest that the banks be held tot he letter of the law. If the borrower showed up at closing by way of a straw-man the transaction would have been canceled or the “lender” would have cried “foul!” But now the shoe is on the other foot and what happens from this point forward is going to be interesting.

Sorting Through Lending Costs

The New York Times
By MARYANN HAGGERTY
PLENTY of people have ideas about what you should be told when you’re shopping for a mortgage, but for now, that may not be much help.
Even before it officially opened for business on July 21, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the federal agency created to oversee mortgage lending, started looking at loan shopping. The bureau is legally required to propose by July 2012 a way to streamline mortgage disclosure. It is exploring avenues for combining the two forms that borrowers get now — the three-page Good Faith Estimate and the two-page Truth in Lending Act form.
These forms tell would-be borrowers the terms of their loan — for instance, how payments on an adjustable-rate mortgage change. They also lay out fees.
Although interest rates grab attention, fees can make a big difference, said Eileen Anderson, senior vice president of the Community Development Corporation of Long Island, which provides home buyer education. The easiest way to compare loans, she said, remains the Annual Percentage Rate, or A.P.R. That calculation rolls in fees as well as the stated interest rate. Because lenders are required to follow the same formula, useful comparisons can be made. “That’s the best way to shop for a loan, whether it’s 10 years ago, or now,” she said.
In May, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau solicited reactions to two versions of a form that combines the current forms onto one double-sided sheet. It received more than 13,000 comments. According to a bureau summary, people praised the effort, but had specific suggestions on layout and phrasing.
On June 27 the bureau posted two more revised versions. The comment period on them closed July 5; among those responding was the Mortgage Bankers Association, which said in a three-page Department of Housing and Urban Developmentoverhauled the Good Faith Estimate — an effort that involved years of soliciting comments and was mightily resisted by some in the lending industry. That form not only changed the way information was presented, but also required brokers and lenders to commit to many parts of their estimates — a big change, as previous estimates sometimes had little relationship to actual closing costs.
But the forms themselves are longer and, for some borrowers, more confusing than the previous ones, Ms. Anderson said.
The form is still “horrible, just horrible,” said Mark Yecies, an owner of SunQuest Funding, a lender in Cranford, N.J. “The G.F.E. doesn’t actually itemize the closing costs in such a way that makes it easy for a borrower to understand what they are.”
Still, he advises people to get the form from every lender they approach. “If you receive approximate closing costs in an e-mail or a form that is not the G.F.E.,” he said, “it doesn’t mean squat.”
He added that some lenders had become adept at manipulating the estimates, by providing interest-rate quotations that expire almost instantaneously, or by low-balling fees in instances where they have legal flexibility. “If you get two or three different G.F.E.’s and there’s several thousand dollars’ difference,” he said, “you know someone is playing games.”
But David Flores, a financial counselor with GreenPath Debt Solutions in New York, which provides home buyer education, says game playing is not as big a problem as it used to be. “We’re removed from the day when it was a 3 percent interest rate with a big asterisk,” with the asterisk leading to fine print about teaser rates, he said.
Borrowers seem to have learned a lot from the attention paid to shaky loans in the last few years, he said. “More people are asking the right questions when it comes to these adjustable rates and exotic loan types. More people are wise to them.”
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One Response

  1. Don’t be expecting the CFPB to come riding into D.C. on a white horse to save the day. While Amerika slept, the House passed a bill essentially neutering the new agency even before the Grand Opening paint had dried.
    In times passed, the oligarchy hid behind shuttered doors, doing their nasties out of sight. Now days, they’re in your face and even daring the populace to do anything about their over-reach. Obama has said that he’d veto any such bill. However, what he’s said he would do and what he has actually done has differed in every case to date. In the mean time, the only change Obama and crew have offered the average Amerikan is a change of address, as their home is sold out from under them.
    We’d better start reaching back people, before it’s too late. Matt Stoller:
    Two years ago at this time we were in the midst of a major battle about whether and to what extent Congress would stand up to Wall Street and financial industry special interests and change the failed program of deregulation that led to the financial crisis. One year ago we applauded the progress made with the passage of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Today we are celebrating the new Consumer Protection Bureau officially opening its doors– so that for the first time there is a cop on the beat ensuring fair play for consumers in the financial marketplace.
    But the battle for accountability and transparency is anything but over. Today the House has passed H.R. 1315 the ‘Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act’– a bill title that would make George Orwell blush. In fact, HR 1315 would cut the CFPB off at the knees, and make it impossible for it to do the job we need it to: standing up for Main Street, even when Wall Street doesn’t want it to.
    Earlier this week, we released a poll with AARP and the Center for Responsible Lending that demonstrates widespread support for the CFPB and Wall Street reform. By a 3 to 1 margin Americans want financial firms held accountable and financial reforms to take effect. And they want the CFPB– created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010– to be up and running. By overwhelming margins and across the political spectrum they want the CFPB to make credit offers clearer, they want rules of the road for all kinds of financial companies, and they want an end to tricks and traps.
    Public Citizen was even more brutal in its assessment– and even more on target. Bartlett Naylor, Public Citizen’s Financial Policy Counsel:
    Public Citizen deplores the shameful vote in the House of Representatives today to emasculate the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. A House majority that votes against the interests of its own constituents who continue to suffer massive unemployment from the bank-caused recession has clearly lost its moral compass.
    There’s only one constituency that favors gutting the CFPB– abusive bankers. Unfortunately, the banking industry continues to funnel some of its profits into a lobby offensive to dismantle the new consumer agency so as to shield itself from the new cop on the beat enacted in the year-old Dodd-Frank law. And it paid off today.
    Call your reps and tell them that you will not stand for this treasonous behavior. And then vote them all out next year, each and every one of them.

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Wednesday, July 13, 2011

THIS IS WHY A FORENSIC AUDIT IS SO VERY IMPORTANT!

What role does securitization play in the home mortgage market?

  

I purchased my investment property in 2005 for $2.1 million dollars. Recently, (over the past 18 months) I've had a tremendously high vacancy rate due to the poor economy and it began taking a toll on all my reserves just to maintain the property. I tried to negotiate with my lender (Bank of America) for a modification. I went round and round with the bank, submitting documents and so on and in the end, Bank of America denied me for a modification. I couldn't understand why they wouldn't modify my loan when it was clear that the economy hamstringed my ability to service the debt. The only thing that Bank of America could tell me was that the investor was the one who declined the modification. I asked who the investor was and they would not tell me. It was then that I began to look closer at my original loan and I saw on the Deed of Trust that MERS was listed as the Beneficiary. With all the information about MERS in the news I decided to talk to an attorney. My attorney had an auditing company called Lighthouse Consulting Group review my documents for both a forensic analysis of my original loan documents as well as a Mortgage Securitization Audit. It turned out that my loan was securitized in a trust called "Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2005- 8". It was in this trust; there is a pooling and serving agreement, which governs the rules of the REMIC Trust. In my loans pooling and servicing agreement, it said specifically that any loan modified would require a buy-back from the servicer. Now, it was about this time that I began to default on my loan and was looking at ultimately losing my investment property. I was already 6 months in default at this point. The individual I talked to that is an attorney and real estate broker immediately ordered a forensic audit for predatory lending. Commercial properties do not have TILA and RESPA violations. The attorney also ordered a securitization audit to verify if the lender that filed the NOD was actually in proper standing. Both audits reveled several issues about my loan. First, the forensic audit proved that my lender had wrongfully calculated my payment it was overstated by $350 per month. Secondly, the loan itself was an adjustable loan based off the Libor Index, which was dropping, but the loan always adjusted up. This was a major development in a very positive way for me. Then, I had the securitization audit show that my loan was never securitized properly and the note and deed were not even with the same party. My attorney drafted a complaint, outlining everything I have mentioned. As soon as the lender was served, they contacted my attorney and settled without going to court. The settlement I got was a principal balance reduction of $400,000; my interest rate was reduced to 4.5% fixed for 30 years. The auditing company that produced all of these discoveries was Lighthouse Consulting Group in Santa Ana, CA. My initial contact was Vic Pillai. I reached him at (714) 486- 0654.

Read more: http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_role_does_securitization_play_in_the_home_mortgage_market#ixzz1S0DpsGTT

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Wednesday, July 6, 2011

WHY I LOVE NEIL GARFIELD'S BLOG


WHY THE BANKERS WILL LOSE AND GO TO JAIL

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Calwestern is a standard player in foreclosures. The thing to remember is that the function of Calwestern, Recontrust (BOA) et al did not exist before securitization. So the question to ask is why would they need a substitute trustee or different servicer to pursue foreclosure if the case was otherwise conforming to the conditions of a judicial foreclosure. The answer is that they wouldn’t and that the creation of these entities by the banks is simply to create an alter ego for the banks so it doesn’t seem as brazen as naming themselves as trustee, or attorney in fact, or authorized signer, whatever that means.
  • According to Arizona case law the trustee on a deed of trust is required to exercise due diligence at an even higher level than would expect because, the courts say, the protections of a judicial foreclosure are absent. In other words, the courts recognize that there is considerable peril resulting from moral hazard, as it would take very little to steal a piece of property, based upon the premise that the borrower did not pay (which is not always true, as some people, like RD continue to pay the taxes, insurance, maintenance, etc. on the property as per the terms of the mortgage, assuming the mortgage was valid). The hazard exists even without securitization.
  • With securitization, the moral hazard rises to new levels. If the creditor is either unknown, unidentified or difficult to define, then non-judicial foreclosure is simply not available to would-be foreclosers because they need a declaration of rights from the court to determine who is the correct beneficiary, who is the creditor who can submit a credit bid at auction, and who should receive a deed from the trustee if there is an auction.
  • With securitization as it was applied over the last 15 years the moral hazard went into the red zone. Investors were in all cases the source of funds for any loan that was funded. The mere existence of conditions in which there is an expectation of payback on money advanced does not create a secured loan. It might not even establish a loan, since there are other causes of action like unjust enrichment, constructive trust etc., that could come into play in suing to recover the money advanced. Nor does it necessarily establish the principal due because of the various third parties whose liability, inchoate until the loan is signed, becomes a procedural guarantee. When those third parties start paying on the obligation — to the investor who did not receive a note from the borrower but rather received a bond from their own entity which was “backed” by assets that did not exist at the time of the issuance of the bond and the advance of money by the investor — the borrower’s obligation to the creditor (if one can be identified) is correspondingly reduced AND the possibility of a new liability to the third party that made the payment arises.
  • Why are trustees substituted? Because the banks don’t want due diligence and extra care being taken to determine if the instructions on default and sale are correctly stated from an authorized entity. If they did, then the trustee would refuse to send the notice of default and the notice of sale. That would force the would-be foreclosers to plead a case in judicial foreclosure, which in Arizona conforms to most states on judicial foreclosure. This would shift the burden of proof to the banks, without a motion to realign the parties. Basic inquiry would raise red flags as to the existence of a default (servicer is continuing to pay), the amount of the obligation due (after third party payments on guarantee and counterparty liability), and the identification of the true beneficiary who is one of two parties to whom the trustee owes a duty of due diligence. If the foreclosure is illegal then BOTH the real secured party, if there is one, and the homeowner suffer maximum exposure to economic damage — and that is exactly what is happening.
  • Why can’t they win in judicial foreclosures and why are judicial sales void like non-judicial sales? Because if there is a creditor at all under normal definitions it must be the party who actually advanced the money and that is ONLY the investors. If it isn’t legally the investors it would be under some novel theory that does not conform to the theory of bills and notes developed over centuries and codified in the Uniform Commercial Code. And THAT TOO would obviously require a judicial determination, because without a judicial determination of how an intermediary could fill the shoes of the source of funds, there can be no foreclosure of any kind.
  1. All other parties are intermediaries like when you write a check, and the check is processed through the issuer’s bank (i.e., the bank shown on the check you wrote), the issuer’s bank’s account processor, the Federal reserve, the receiving bank’s account processor and the receiving bank. In this case, because there was fraud in the sale of the bonds to the investors, they are looking for relief from the investment bankers who sold them the bogus mortgage bonds — most of which were never issued on paper and were created only by the entry of data by hand or digitally in a computer.
  2. No group of investors have banded together or filed separate attempts to deal directly with the homeowner in court or out of court. The reason is that if they did so they would be adopting the fraudulent and predatory practices used in obtaining the signature of the borrower on loan papers that were riddled with deficiencies and faced with defenses, affirmative defenses and counterclaims for acts that they may well have known nothing about. The investors would be defenseless in a lawsuit with homeowners over the validity of the loan papers. They know that, and they know that  the value of the property was so artificially inflated that even if they won they would only recover pennies on the dollar after all the expenses of litigation and sale of the property. There simply is no reason for the investors to look for payment from homeowners. They have a much more alluring target — the largest banks in the world with the deepest pockets who perpetrated the original fraud on the investors by selling them bogus mortgage bonds that were not backed by assets, and even if they were backed by assets, those assets consisted of loans that did not conform to the agreement contained in the prospectus, pooling and service agreement and other securitization documentation.
  • So the function of the new intermediary parties in foreclosures who never existed before is to NOT perform the duties required of them by statute and common law. The original trustee, who is still legally the trustee on the deed of trust but might not know it, would perform the due diligence because they are not owned and controlled by the banks who are committing this fraud.
  • Again the moral hazard rises into and perhaps past the red zone when the intermediaries themselves pretend to be the creditors even though they were neither the source of funds at the closing of the “loan” with “borrower” nor were they ever party to a transaction in which consideration was paid for the legal transfer of the alleged obligation or liability of the “borrower.” The APPARENT transfer of the loan or note or mortgage is substituted for the real thing. And the more it is transferred the more it seems like there was something being transferred when in fact there wasn’t anything transferred, and in fact it is highly probable in most cases that there was no legal encumbrance ever perfected on the advance of funds that everyone is calling a “loan.”
  • The same method of operation was used with the trustee function. The apparent substitution of trustee gave rise to the appearance that the beneficiary had authorized the substitution and that the beneficiary had the right to substitute trustees. All the other documents flowing from the substitution of trustee and the “assignment” give rise to the appearance of a normal foreclosure, or something close enough that a quick glance satisfies most judges that everything is on order. But 100% of the time, when a Judge gives more than a casual glance the Judge becomes alarmed and sometimes downright irate that the banks are trying to pull something, and they are. This is ALWAYS followed by a confidential settlement where people get their homes without any mortgage and the debt is cancelled, because it was paid anyway (several times over in many cases) by third parties.
  • An assignment of a note does not transfer the note. If you write a check and the person to whom you write the check executes an assignment of that check, the recipient (assignee) cannot take assignment to your bank and get paid — not without the check — and even with the check they still won’t pay until they have the check and it is endorsed to the party who received the assignment (in which case they didn’t need an assignment — what they needed was an indorsement guaranteed by someone who vouches for the signature before they accept the check as an instrument that draws upon the money in your bank. There is no difference between a note and a check. You need an indorsement.
  • The indorsement needs to have some signature guarantee or other acceptable measure of security that the person who signed the indorsement was really the payee of the instrument. THIS IS WHERE THE BANKS STEPPED ON A RAKE. Out of pure greed, since the investors were not interested in recovering from the homeowners, the banks perceived an “opportunity” to create the appearance of transfer of the note under circumstances where it appeared as though the note was valid and it appeared as though the mortgage lien was perfected. IN ORDER TO DO THIS THEY HAD TO COMMIT PERJURY, FRAUD, AND BREACH OF VIRTUALLY EVERY LAW AND RULE REGARDING TRANSFER AND RECORDING OF LOANS, NOTE AND MORTGAGES OR DEEDS OF TRUST.
  • All of this brings us to the issue of what is euphemistically referred to as “robosigning” — which in actuality is forgery and suborning perjury. The signature of a person, real or imagined is affixed to documents by multiple people without the knowledge or consent of what is being done. The signature of the signer is false and unauthorized. The content of the document identifying the signer is false and unauthorized. The content of the document purporting to have some legal effect (assignment, substitution of trustees, etc.) is false and unauthorized.
  • The Banks want us to believe that the robosigning was nothing of the sort — that it was merely an ill-conceived mechanism for dealing with an overwhelming number of foreclosures. In fact, it is a substitute for real events that is getting by Judges who merely glance at paperwork instead of examining the paperwork. There would be no overwhelming paper crash if the securitization was real — because the securitization participants were required to execute all required documentation (in their own “securitization” documentation) contemporaneously with the loan closing. Had they done so, the securitization would have been real, and the paperwork would have been done, along with the loan closing, as each loan was completed. There would be no paper crunch.
  • The reasons they did not do so are many but they all boil down to one central theme. They intended to transfer the money of the investors and the borrowers around like “a whiskey bottle at a frat party,” (Mike Stuckey, MSNBC news) and sell the same loan multiple times through different instruments that made it look like they were creating exotic risk-sharing instruments, but in reality they were selling the same receivables multiple times without the buyers being aware of the reality of the situation because of the complexity of the instruments, which were only so complex because the banks didn’t want anyone to understand them. Even Alan Greenspan said that he and a 100 PHD economists could not understand those instruments. That was the intent and the result. A recorded, executed indorsed instrument, pursuant to law, would have put prospective buyers on notice that they were buying something that had already been sold numerous times.
  • Under the guise of anonymity and plausible deniability, the banks created the perfect PONZI scheme that only succeeded because they hid the transfer documents and continue to hide the transfer documents. The entire “bailout” by the government as well as the majority of the assets shown on the balance sheets of these megabanks is based upon the premise that the last transfer document shown was valid and establishes the chain of ownership. Any first year law student knows that the chain is only established starting at the beginning and connecting up each document to the next, with proper execution and delivery on each document in the chain. The lack of any consideration for the “transfers” that the Banks allege speaks volumes as to what they were really doing and they they had actual knowledge that they were committing fraud.
  • And THAT brings us to specific instances of fraud on the court, fraud on the homeowner and fraud on the investors accomplished through suborning perjury and forgery.
  • In R’s case, the substitution of trustee was alleged to have have occurred. It didn’t. The putative lender created an entity that enabled them to substitute their own entity for the real trustee. In this case the signatory was Pamela G. Her signature shows up in hundreds of similar documents in Maricopa County alone, most of which are completely different signatures, which means that at best, all but one of the signatures on all those documents was a forgery. Proffering that in judicial or even a non-judicial proceeding is illegal and probably constitutes suborning (causing)  perjury. The attorneys who regularly use such signatures are hiding behind various protections intended to allow Trustees and attorneys to rely upon what their client gives them. But most attorneys in fact are not actually retained in the conventional sense, so they don’t actually know the identity of their client. And with all the publicity and their own experiences in court they have good grounds to believe that the documents are not real — especially when the practice is to create those documents in the law office or using an outsource “service” provider.
  • Pamela’s signature also shows up in Declaration filed in California case. Since it is a document not normally proffered and her resume shows that she worked for CalWestern, it is possible or even probable that the signature on THAT document was not forgery, but it still was perjury or at least a lie as to its content. In any event, it contains a signature that does not match, even to a layman’s eye, the signature on Katharine’s substitution of trustee nor any of the hundreds of other documents where her signature was used to start the paperwork for a foreclosure.
  • We also have Pamela’s resume which does not list MERS as an employer nor any relationship with MERS. At the time she signed for MERS her resume says she was working for CalWestern. Yet her signature appears as a signatory for MERS as a VP substituting trustees. MERS is clearly identified as having no interest in the loan and in fact specifically disclaims any interest in the transaction, never handles any money, and disclaims any interest in the note, mortgage or other documentation of the alleged “loan.” MERS is also under a cease and desist order that was not in effect at the time the substitution was signed. MERS has also issued an order to all members NOT to use their name in any foreclosure proceeding, which would seem to be another disclaimer of any interest or authority to actually do anything.
  • If the substitution of trustee is invalid or void, then everything that happened after that is void. The “trustee deed” on sale of the property at an “auction” in which the bidder tendered neither the note nor any money was also void. I think this can be brought up de novo on appeal because it corrupts the title records.

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Wednesday, April 20, 2011

WELLS FARGO FORECLOSES FASTER, MODIFIES LESS, WHICH EXPLAINS WHY IT HAS THE BIGGEST REAL ESTATE PORTFOLIO OF ANY BANK. THIS MEANS NOTHING. THESE ASSETS ARE EMPTY HOMES.


Wells' Residential Fundings
Clipped in 1Q, Bank Reveals
Mortgage Related Layoffs of 4,500

Wednesday, April 20, 2011







Wells Fargo & Co., which dominates the nation's residential lending market, saw its home fundings tumble by 34% to $84 billion in the first quarter as higher rates took a bite out of refinancings.
Moreover, its application pipeline, at quarter's end, fell by even more: 38% to $45 billion.
Wells' closest competitor in home lending, Bank of America, experienced a 33% drop in loan production during the quarter.
In its earnings supplement, released early Wednesday morning, the bank also revealed that during the quarter its trimmed its mortgage retail fulfillment staff by 4,500 full-time equivalents or FTEs.
Its residential servicing portfolio totaled $1.8 trillion at the end of March, just about flat compared to both year end and 1Q 2010.
Although Wells' MSRs remained just about unchanged, the bank reported that it marked up the value of its residential servicing asset to $15.64 billion at March 31 — an 8% jump from year end.
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage said  [yeah, right]  its delinquencies and foreclosures continued to fall and are lower than its peers. [And their documents are perfect, and they've never foreclosed in error, we know.  We know.]  At March 31 its home late payments totaled 8.02% compared to 14.3% for Bank of America.   
[Wells, do you actually believe we believe anything you say anymore?  HA!]
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