Showing posts with label Deutsche Bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Deutsche Bank. Show all posts

Thursday, August 25, 2011

MATT TAIBBI EXPOSES SEC

Is the SEC
Covering Up
Wall Street Crimes?

A whistle-blower claims that over the past two decades, the agency has destroyed records of thousands of investigations, whitewashing the files of some of the nation's worst financial criminals.
By MATT TAIBBI
AUGUST 17, 2011 8:00 AM ET
SEC whistleblower shredder paper
Pete Gardner/Getty
Imagine a world in which a man who is repeatedly investigated for a string of serious crimes, but never prosecuted, has his slate wiped clean every time the cops fail to make a case. No more Lifetime channel specials where the murderer is unveiled after police stumble upon past intrigues in some old file – "Hey, chief, didja know this guy had two wives die falling down the stairs?" No more burglary sprees cracked when some sharp cop sees the same name pop up in one too many witness statements. This is a different world, one far friendlier to lawbreakers, where even the suspicion of wrongdoing gets wiped from the record.
That, it now appears, is exactly how the Securities and Exchange Commission has been treating the Wall Street criminals who cratered the global economy a few years back. For the past two decades, according to a whistle-blower at the SEC who recently came forward to Congress, the agency has been systematically destroying records of its preliminary investigations once they are closed. By whitewashing the files of some of the nation's worst financial criminals, the SEC has kept an entire generation of federal investigators in the dark about past inquiries into insider trading, fraud and market manipulation against companies like Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and AIG. With a few strokes of the keyboard, the evidence gathered during thousands of investigations – "18,000 ... including Madoff," as one high-ranking SEC official put it during a panicked meeting about the destruction – has apparently disappeared forever into the wormhole of history.
Under a deal the SEC worked out with the National Archives and Records Administration, all of the agency's records – "including case files relating to preliminary investigations" – are supposed to be maintained for at least 25 years. But the SEC, using history-altering practices that for once actually deserve the overused and usually hysterical term "Orwellian," devised an elaborate and possibly illegal system under which staffers were directed to dispose of the documents from any preliminary inquiry that did not receive approval from senior staff to become a full-blown, formal investigation. Amazingly, the wholesale destruction of the cases – known as MUIs, or "Matters Under Inquiry" – was not something done on the sly, in secret. The enforcement division of the SEC even spelled out the procedure in writing, on the commission's internal website. "After you have closed a MUI that has not become an investigation," the site advised staffers, "you should dispose of any documents obtained in connection with the MUI."
Many of the destroyed files involved companies and individuals who would later play prominent roles in the economic meltdown of 2008. Two MUIs involving con artist Bernie Madoff vanished. So did a 2002 inquiry into financial fraud at Lehman Brothers, as well as a 2005 case of insider trading at the same soon-to-be-bankrupt bank. A 2009 preliminary investigation of insider trading by Goldman Sachs was deleted, along with records for at least three cases involving the infamous hedge fund SAC Capital.
The widespread destruction of records was brought to the attention of Congress in July, when an SEC attorney named Darcy Flynn decided to blow the whistle. According to Flynn, who was responsible for helping to manage the commission's records, the SEC has been destroying records of preliminary investigations since at least 1993. After he alerted NARA to the problem, Flynn reports, senior staff at the SEC scrambled to hide the commission's improprieties.
As a federally protected whistle-blower, Flynn is not permitted to speak to the press. But in evidence he presented to the SEC's inspector general and three congressional committees earlier this summer, the 13-year veteran of the agency paints a startling picture of a federal police force that has effectively been conquered by the financial criminals it is charged with investigating. In at least one case, according to Flynn, investigators at the SEC found their desire to bring a case against an influential bank thwarted by senior officials in the enforcement division – whose director turned around and accepted a lucrative job from the very same bank they had been prevented from investigating. In another case, the agency farmed out its inquiry to a private law firm – one hired by the company under investigation. The outside firm, unsurprisingly, concluded that no further investigation of its client was necessary. To complete the bureaucratic laundering process, Flynn says, the SEC dropped the case and destroyed the files.
Much has been made in recent months of the government's glaring failure to police Wall Street; to date, federal and state prosecutors have yet to put a single senior Wall Street executive behind bars for any of the many well-documented crimes related to the financial crisis. Indeed, Flynn's accusations dovetail with a recent series of damaging critiques of the SEC made by reporters, watchdog groups and members of Congress, all of which seem to indicate that top federal regulators spend more time lunching, schmoozing and job-interviewing with Wall Street crooks than they do catching them. As one former SEC staffer describes it, the agency is now filled with so many Wall Street hotshots from oft-investigated banks that it has been "infected with the Goldman mindset from within."
The destruction of records by the SEC, as outlined by Flynn, is something far more than an administrative accident or bureaucratic fuck-up. It's a symptom of the agency's terminal brain damage. Somewhere along the line, those at the SEC responsible for policing America's banks fell and hit their head on a big pile of Wall Street's money – a blow from which the agency has never recovered. "From what I've seen, it looks as if the SEC might have sanctioned some level of case-related document destruction," says Sen. Chuck Grassley, the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, whose staff has interviewed Flynn. "It doesn't make sense that an agency responsible for investigations would want to get rid of potential evidence. If these charges are true, the agency needs to explain why it destroyed documents, how many documents it destroyed over what time frame and to what extent its actions were consistent with the law."
How did officials at the SEC wind up with a faithful veteran employee – a conservative, mid-level attorney described as a highly reluctant whistle-blower – spilling the agency's most sordid secrets to Congress? In a way, they asked for it.
On May 18th of this year, SEC enforcement director Robert Khuzami sent out a mass e-mail to the agency's staff with the subject line "Lawyers Behaving Badly." In it, Khuzami asked his subordinates to report any experiences they might have had where "the behavior of counsel representing clients in... investigations has been questionable."
Khuzami was asking staffers to recount any stories of outside counsel behaving unethically. But Flynn apparently thought his boss was looking for examples of lawyers "behaving badly" anywhere, including within the SEC. And he had a story to share he'd kept a lid on for years. "Mr. Khuzami may have gotten something more than he expected," Flynn's lawyer, a former SEC whistle-blower named Gary Aguirre, later explained to Congress.
Flynn responded to Khuzami with a letter laying out one such example of misbehaving lawyers within the SEC. It involved a case from very early in Flynn's career, back in 2000, when he was working with a group of investigators who thought they had a "slam-dunk" case against Deutsche Bank, the German financial giant. A few years earlier, Rolf Breuer, the bank's CEO, had given an interview to Der Spiegel in which he denied that Deutsche was involved in übernahmegespräche – takeover talks – to acquire a rival American firm, Bankers Trust. But the statement was apparently untrue – and it sent the stock of Bankers Trust tumbling, potentially lowering the price for the merger. Flynn and his fellow SEC investigators, suspecting that investors of Bankers Trust had been defrauded, opened a MUI on the case.
A Matter Under Inquiry is just a preliminary sort of look-see – a way for the SEC to check out the multitude of tips it gets about suspicious trades, shady stock scams and false disclosures, and to determine which of the accusations merit a formal investigation. At the MUI stage, an SEC investigator can conduct interviews or ask a bank to send in information voluntarily. Bumping a MUI up to a formal investigation is critical, because it enables investigators to pull out the full law-enforcement ass-kicking measures – subpoenas, depositions, everything short of hot pokers and waterboarding.  In the Deutsche case, Flynn and other SEC investigators got past the MUI stage and used their powers to collect sworn testimony and documents indicating that plenty ofübernahmegespräche indeed had been going on when Breuer spoke to Der Spiegel. Based on the evidence, they sent an "Action Memorandum" to senior SEC staff, formally recommending that the agency press forward and file suit against Deutsche. 
Breuer responded to the threat as big banks like Deutsche often do: He hired a former SEC enforcement director to lobby the agency to back off. The ex-insider, Gary Lynch, launched a creative and inspired defense, producing a linguistic expert who argued thatübernahmegespräche only means "advanced stage of discussions." Nevertheless, the request to proceed with the case was approved by several levels of the SEC's staff. All that was needed to move forward was a thumbs-up from the director of enforcement at the time, Richard Walker.
But then a curious thing happened. On July 10th, 2001, Flynn and the other investigators were informed that Walker was mysteriously recusing himself from the Deutsche case. Two weeks later, on July 23rd, the enforcement division sent a letter to Deutsche that read, "Inquiry in the above-captioned matter has been terminated." The bank was in the clear; the SEC was dropping its fraud investigation. In contradiction to the agency's usual practice, it provided no explanation for its decision to close the case.
On October 1st of that year, the mystery was solved: Dick Walker was named general counsel of Deutsche. Less than 10 weeks after the SEC shut down its investigation of the bank, the agency's director of enforcement was handed a cushy, high-priced job at Deutsche.
Deutsche's influence in the case didn't stop there. A few years later, in 2004, Walker hired none other than Robert Khuzami, a young federal prosecutor, to join him at Deutsche. The two would remain at the bank until February 2009, when Khuzami joined the SEC as Flynn's new boss in the enforcement division. When Flynn sent his letter to Khuzami complaining about misbehavior by Walker, he was calling out Khuzami's own mentor.
The circular nature of the case illustrates the revolving-door dynamic that has become pervasive at the SEC. A recent study by the Project on Government Oversight found that over the past five years, former SEC personnel filed 789 notices disclosing their intent to represent outside companies before the agency – sometimes within days of their having left the SEC. More than half of the disclosures came from the agency's enforcement division, who went to bat for the financial industry four times more often than ex-staffers from other wings of the SEC.
Even a cursory glance at a list of the agency's most recent enforcement directors makes it clear that the SEC's top policemen almost always wind up jumping straight to jobs representing the banks they were supposed to regulate. Lynch, who represented Deutsche in the Flynn case, served as the agency's enforcement chief from 1985 to 1989, before moving to the firm of Davis Polk, which boasts many top Wall Street clients. He was succeeded by William McLucas, who left the SEC in 1998 to work for WilmerHale, a Wall Street defense firm so notorious for snatching up top agency veterans that it is sometimes referred to as "SEC West." McLucas was followed by Dick Walker, who defected to Deutsche in 2001, and he was in turn followed by Stephen Cutler, who now serves as general counsel for JP Morgan Chase. Next came Linda Chatman Thomsen, who stepped down to join Davis Polk, only to be succeeded in 2009 by Khuzami, Walker's former protégé at Deutsche Bank.
This merry-go-round of current and former enforcement directors has repeatedly led to accusations of improprieties. In 2008, in a case cited by the SEC inspector general, Thomsen went out of her way to pass along valuable information to Cutler, the former enforcement director who had gone to work for JP Morgan. According to the inspector general, Thomsen signaled Cutler that the SEC was unlikely to take action that would hamper JP Morgan's move to buy up Bear Stearns. In another case, the inspector general found, an assistant director of enforcement was instrumental in slowing down an investigation into the $7 billion Ponzi scheme allegedly run by Texas con artist R. Allen Stanford – and then left the SEC to work for Stanford, despite explicitly being denied permission to do so by the agency's ethics office. "Every lawyer in Texas and beyond is going to get rich on this case, OK?" the official later explained. "I hated being on the sidelines."
Small wonder, then, that SEC staffers often have trouble getting their bosses to approve full-blown investigations against even the most blatant financial criminals. For a fledgling MUI to become a formal investigation, it has to make the treacherous leap from the lower rungs of career-level staffers like Flynn all the way up to the revolving-door level at the top, where senior management is composed largely of high-priced appointees from the private sector who have strong social and professional ties to the very banks they are charged with regulating. And if senior management didn't approve an investigation, the documents often wound up being destroyed – as Flynn would later discover.
After the Deutsche fiasco over Bankers Trust, Flynn continued to work at the SEC for four more years. He briefly left the agency to dabble in real estate, then returned in 2008 to serve as an attorney in the enforcement division. In January 2010, he accepted new responsibilities that included helping to manage the disposition of records for the division – and it was then he first became aware of the agency's possibly unlawful destruction of MUI records.
Flynn discovered a directive on the enforcement division's internal website ordering staff to destroy "any records obtained in connection" with closed MUIs. The directive appeared to violate federal law, which gives responsibility for maintaining and destroying all records to the National Archives and Records Administration. Over a decade earlier, in fact, the SEC had struck a deal with NARA stipulating that investigative records were to be maintained for 25 years – and that if any files were to be destroyed after that, the shredding was to be done by NARA, not the SEC.
But Flynn soon learned that the records for thousands of preliminary investigations no longer existed. In his letter to Congress, Flynn estimates that the practice of destroying MUIs had begun as early as 1993, and has resulted in at least 9,000 case files being destroyed. For all the thousands of tips that had come in to the SEC, and the thousands of interviews that had been conducted by the agency's staff, all that remained were a few perfunctory lines for each case. The mountains of evidence gathered were no longer in existence.
To read through the list of dead and buried cases that Flynn submitted to Congress is like looking through an infrared camera at a haunted house of the financial crisis, with the ghosts of missed prosecutions flashing back and forth across the screen. A snippet of the list:







PARTYMUI #OPENED/CLOSEDISSUE
Goldman SachsMLA-019096/99 - 4/00Market Manipulation
Deutsche BankMHO-0935611/01 - 7/02Insider Trading
Deutsche BankMHO-094322/02 - 8/02Market Manipulation
Lehman BrothersMNY-070133/02 - 7/02Financial Fraud
Goldman SachsMNY-0819811/09 - 12/09Insider Trading

One MUI – case MNY-08145 – involved allegations of insider trading at AIG on September 15th, 2008, right in the middle of the insurance giant's collapse. In that case, an AIG employee named Jacqueline Millan reported irregularities in the trading of AIG stock to her superiors, only to find herself fired. Incredibly, instead of looking into the matter itself, the SEC agreed to accept "an internal investigation by outside counsel or AIG." The last note in the file indicates that "the staff plans to speak with the outside attorneys on Monday, August 24th [2009], when they will share their findings with us." The fact that the SEC trusted AIG's lawyers to investigate the matter shows the basic bassackwardness of the agency's approach to these crash-era investigations. The SEC formally closed the case on October 1st, 2009.
The episode with AIG highlights yet another obstacle that MUIs experience on the road to becoming formal investigations. During the past decade, the SEC routinely began allowing financial firms to investigate themselves. Imagine the LAPD politely asking a gang of Crips and their lawyers to issue a report on whether or not a drive-by shooting by the Crips should be brought before a grand jury – that's basically how the SEC now handles many preliminary investigations against Wall Street targets.
The evolution toward this self-policing model began in 2001, when a shipping and food-service conglomerate called Seaboard aggressively investigated an isolated case of accounting fraud at one of its subsidiaries. Seaboard fired the guilty parties and made sweeping changes to its internal practices – and the SEC was so impressed that it instituted a new policy of giving "credit" to companies that police themselves. In practice, that means the agency simply steps aside and allows companies to slap themselves on the wrists. In the case against Seaboard, for instance, the SEC rewarded the firm by issuing no fines against it.
According to Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC, the Seaboard case also prompted the SEC to begin permitting companies to hire their own counsel to conduct their own inquiries. At first, he says, the process worked fairly well. But then President Bush appointed the notoriously industry-friendly Christopher Cox to head up the SEC, and the "outside investigations" turned into whitewash jobs. "The investigations nowadays are probably not worth the money you spend on them," Turner says.
Harry Markopolos, a certified fraud examiner best known for sounding a famously unheeded warning about Bernie Madoff way back in 2000, says the SEC's practice of asking suspects to investigate themselves is absurd. In a serious investigation, he says, "the last person you want to trust is the person being accused or their lawyer." The practice helped Madoff escape for years. "The SEC took Bernie's word for everything," Markopolos says.
At the SEC, having realized that the agency was destroying documents, Flynn became concerned that he was overseeing an illegal policy. So in the summer of last year, he reached out to NARA, asking them for guidance on the issue.
That request sparked a worried response from Paul Wester, NARA's director of modern records. On July 29th, 2010, Wester sent a letter to Barry Walters, who oversees document requests for the SEC. "We recently learned from Darcy Flynn... that for the past 17 years the SEC has been destroying closed Matters Under Inquiry files," Wester wrote. "If you confirm that federal records have been destroyed improperly, please ensure that no further such disposals take place and provide us with a written report within 30 days."
Wester copied the letter to Adam Storch, a former Goldman Sachs executive who less than a year earlier had been appointed as managing executive of the SEC's enforcement division. Storch's appointment was not without controversy. "I'm not sure what's scarier," Daniel Indiviglio of The Atlantic observed, "that this guy worked at an investment bank that many believe has questionable ethics and too cozy a Washington connection, or that he's just 29." In any case, Storch reacted to the NARA letter the way the SEC often does – by circling the wagons and straining to find a way to blow off the problem without admitting anything.
Last August, as the clock wound down on NARA's 30-day deadline, Storch and two top SEC lawyers held a meeting with Flynn to discuss how to respond. Flynn's notes from the meeting, which he passed along to Congress, show the SEC staff wondering aloud if admitting the truth to NARA might be a bad idea, given the fact that there might be criminal liability.
"We could say that we do not believe there has been disposal inconsistent with the schedule," Flynn quotes Ken Hall, an assistant chief counsel for the SEC, as saying.
"There are implications to admit what was destroyed," Storch chimed in. It would be "not wise for me to take on the exposure voluntarily. If this leads to something, what rings in my ear is that Barry [Walters, the SEC documents officer] said: This is serious, could lead to criminal liability."
When the subject of how many files were destroyed came up, Storch answered: "18,000 MUIs destroyed, including Madoff."
Four days later, the SEC responded to NARA with a hilariously convoluted nondenial denial. "The Division is not aware of any specific instances of the destruction of records from any other MUI," the letter states. "But we cannot say with certainty that no such documents have been destroyed over the past 17 years." The letter goes on to add that "the Division has taken steps... to ensure that no MUI records are destroyed while we review this issue."
Translation: Hey, maybe records were destroyed, maybe they weren't. But if we did destroy records, we promise not to do it again – for now.
The SEC's unwillingness to admit the extent of the wrong doing left Flynn in a precarious position. The agency has a remarkably bad record when it comes to dealing with whistle-blowers. Back in 2005, when Flynn's attorney, Gary Aguirre, tried to pursue an insider-trading case against Pequot Capital that involved John Mack, the future CEO of Morgan Stanley, he was fired by phone while on vacation. Two Senate committees later determined that Aguirre, who has since opened a private practice representing whistle-blowers, was dismissed improperly as part of a "process of reprisal" by the SEC. Two whistle-blowers in the Stanford case, Julie Preuitt and Joel Sauer, also experienced retaliation – including reprimands and demotions – after raising concerns about superficial investigations. "There's no mechanism to raise these issues at the SEC," says another former whistle-blower. Contacting the agency's inspector general, he adds, is considered "the nuclear option" – a move "well-known to be a career-killer."
In Flynn's case, both he and Aguirre tried to keep the matter in-house, appealing to SEC chairman Mary Schapiro with a promise not to go outside the agency if she would grant Flynn protection against reprisal. When no such offer was forthcoming, Flynn went to the agency's inspector general before sending a detailed letter about the wrongdoing to three congressional committees.
One of the offices Flynn contacted was that of Sen. Grassley, who was in the midst of his own battle with the SEC. Frustrated with the agency's failure to punish major players on Wall Street, the Iowa Republican had begun an investigation into how the SEC follows up on outside complaints. Specifically, he wrote a letter to FINRA, another regulatory agency, to ask how many complaints it had referred to the SEC about SAC Capital, the hedge fund run by reptilian billionaire short-seller Stevie Cohen.
SAC has long been accused of a variety of improprieties, from insider trading to harassment. But no charge in recent Wall Street history is crazier than an episode involving a SAC executive named Ping Jiang, who was accused in 2006 of enacting a torturous hazing program. According to a civil lawsuit that was later dropped, Jiang allegedly forced a new trader named Andrew Tong to take female hormones, come to work wearing a dress and lipstick, have "foreign objects" inserted in his rectum, and allow Jiang to urinate in his mouth. (I'm not making this up.)
Grassley learned that over the past decade, FINRA had referred 19 complaints about suspicious trades at SAC to federal regulators. Curious to see how many of those referrals had been looked into, Grassley wrote the SEC on May 24th, asking for evidence that the agency had properly investigated the cases.
Two weeks later, on June 9th, Khuzami sent Grassley a surprisingly brusque answer: "We generally do not comment on the status of investigations or related referrals, and, in turn, are not providing information concerning the specific FINRA referrals you identified." Translation: We're not giving you the records, so blow us.
Grassley later found out from FINRA that it had actually referred 65 cases about SAC to the SEC, making the lack of serious investigations even more inexplicable. Angered by Khuzami's response, he sent the SEC another letter on June 15th demanding an explanation, but no answer has been forthcoming.
In the interim, Grassley's office was contacted by Flynn, who explained that among the missing MUIs he had uncovered were at least three involving SAC – one in 2006, one in 2007 and one in 2010, involving charges of insider trading and currency manipulation. All three cases were closed by the SEC, and the records apparently destroyed.
On August 17th, Grassley sent a letter to the SEC about the Flynn allegations, demanding to know if it was indeed true that the SEC had destroyed records. He also asked if the agency's failure to produce evidence of investigations into SAC Capital were related to the missing MUIs.
The SEC's inspector general is investigating the destroyed MUIs and plans to issue a report. NARA is also seeking answers. "We've asked the SEC to look into the matter and we're awaiting their response," says Laurence Brewer, a records officer for NARA. For its part, the SEC is trying to explain away the illegality of its actions through a semantic trick. John Nester, the agency's spokesman, acknowledges that "documents related to MUIs" have been destroyed. "I don't have any reason to believe that it hasn't always been the policy," he says. But Nester suggests that such documents do not "meet the federal definition of a record," and therefore don't have to be preserved under federal law.
But even if SEC officials manage to dodge criminal charges, it won't change what happened: The nation's top financial police destroyed more than a decade's worth of intelligence they had gathered on some of Wall Street's most egregious offenders. "The SEC not keeping the MUIs – you can see why this would be bad," says Markopolos, the fraud examiner famous for breaking the Madoff case. "The reason you would want to keep them is to build a pattern. That way, if you get five MUIs over a period of 20 years on something similar involving the same company, you should be able to connect five dots and say, 'You know, I've had five MUIs – they're probably doing something. Let's go tear the place apart.'" Destroy the MUIs, and Wall Street banks can commit the exact same crime over and over, without anyone ever knowing.
Regulation isn't a panacea. The SEC could have placed federal agents on every corner of lower Manhattan throughout the past decade, and it might not have put a dent in the massive wave of corruption and fraud that left the economy in flames three years ago. And even if SEC staffers from top to bottom had been fully committed to rooting out financial corruption, the agency would still have been seriously hampered by a lack of resources that often forces it to abandon promising cases due to a shortage of manpower. "It's always a triage," is how one SEC veteran puts it. "And it's worse now."
But we're equally in the dark about another hypothetical. Forget about what might have been if the SEC had followed up in earnest on all of those lost MUIs. What if even a handful of them had turned into real cases? How many investors might have been saved from crushing losses if Lehman Brothers had been forced to reveal its shady accounting way back in 2002? Might the need for taxpayer bailouts have been lessened had fraud cases against Citigroup and Bank of America been pursued in 2005 and 2007? And would the U.S. government have doubled down on its bailout of AIG if it had known that some of the firm's executives were suspected of insider trading in September 2008?
It goes without saying that no ordinary law-enforcement agency would willingly destroy its own evidence. In fact, when it comes to  garden-variety crooks, more and more police agencies are catching criminals with the aid of large and well-maintained databases. "Street-level law enforcement is increasingly data-driven," says Bill Laufer, a criminology professor at the University of Pennsylvania. "For a host of reasons, though, we are starved for good data on both white-collar and corporate crime. So the idea that we would take the little data we do have and shred it, without a legal requirement to do so, calls for a very creative explanation."
We'll never know what the impact of those destroyed cases might have been; we'll never know if those cases were closed for good reasons or bad. We'll never know exactly who got away with what, because federal regulators have weighted down a huge sack of Wall Street's dirty laundry and dumped it in a lake, never to be seen again.
Editor’s Note: The online version of this article has been amended from the print version to reflect that the SEC’s case against Deutsche Bank proceeded beyond a Matter of Inquiry to a full-blown investigation.





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Wednesday, August 24, 2011

““Like a sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that requires a writing signed by the grantor.” Ibanez, 458 Mass at 649. Deutsche had not received a written assignment of the mortgage from MERS prior to May 3, 2011. The fact that it had possession of the mortgage instrument did not render Deutsche the mortgagee and thus it lacked the power to sell the property.”


DEUTSCH LOSES AGAIN: POOL DID NOT RECEIVE LOAN

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TRANSFER TO POOL AFTER FORECLOSURE INITIATED: VOID

 The fact that Deutsche had possession of the mortgage, however, is irrelevant to its status as mortgagee. While a promissory note endorsed in blank may be enforced by the party in possession of the note, this is not the case with a mortgage”
“Like a sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that requires a writing signed by the grantor.” Ibanez, 458 Mass at 649. Deutsche had not received a written assignment of the mortgage from MERS prior to May 3, 2011. The fact that it had possession of the mortgage instrument did not render Deutsche the mortgagee and thus it lacked the power to sell the property.”
In re: SIMA SCHWARTZ, Chapter 7, Debtor.
SIMA SCHWARTZ, Plaintiff,
v.
HOMEQ SERVICING, AGENT FOR DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE and DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE, Defendants.
Case No. 06-42476-MSH, Adversary Proceeding No. 07-04098.
United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Central Division.
August 22, 2011.
David G. Baker, Boston, MA, for the plaintiff.
Christopher Matheson, Richard C. Demerle and Christopher Decosta, Michienzie & Sawin, LLC, Boston, MA, for both defendants.
Gary A. Barnes, Sarah-Nell Walsh, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
MELVIN S. HOFFMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.
After the plaintiff, Sima Schwartz, presented her case in chief during the first day of the trial in this adversary proceeding, upon oral motion of the defendants, HomEq Servicing and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, I granted judgment on partial findings in favor of the defendants on all counts of the complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c), made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Ms. Schwartz then moved for a new trial as a result of which judgment was vacated on count I of the complaint only.Schwartz v. HomEq Servicing (In re Schwartz), 2011 WL 1331963 (Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2011). In count I, Ms. Schwartz alleges that the May 24, 2006 foreclosure sale of her home by Deutsche was invalid because Deutsche did not own the mortgage on the property at the relevant time.1 I reopened the trial so that the defendants could present their case with respect to that count, which they did on June 1, 2011. Based on the evidence and legal submissions presented by the parties, my findings of fact, conclusions of law and order are set forth below.
Jurisdiction and Standing
Core jurisdiction over this case is conferred upon the bankruptcy court by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) and (O). See Atighi v. DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. (In re Atighi), 2011 WL 3303454, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2011). Ms. Schwartz’s standing to seek relief is based on her property interest in light of the alleged wrongful foreclosure. Brae Asset Fund, L.P. v. Kelly, 223 B.R. 50, 56 (D. Mass. 1998).
Legal Framework
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14 establishes the procedure for a mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage by exercise of the statutory power of sale. The statute provides that prior to a foreclosure sale a notice of the sale must appear weekly for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper either published in or generally circulated in the city or town where the property is located. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has recently clarified that a foreclosing mortgagee must hold the mortgage as of the date that the first notice of sale is published.U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 941 N.E.2d 40 (2011). If the party intending to foreclose the mortgage is not the original mortgagee, a typical state of affairs when a mortgage loan is owned by the trustee of a securitized pool of mortgage loans, then the foreclosing mortgagee must hold a valid assignment of the mortgage prior to publishing the first sale notice.
The Defendants’ Case
It is undisputed that Deutsche was not the original mortgagee of the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home, so it must prove that the mortgage was assigned to it prior to the date when the first foreclosure notice was published. As discussed in the memorandum and order on the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, while the evidence established that an assignment of the mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) to Deutsche was executed on May 23, 2006, the day before the foreclosure sale, this assignment, being well after the notice of foreclosure sale was first published, did not confer on Deutsche the power to foreclose on May 24. The Supreme Judicial Court in Ibanez,however, offered an alternative method for a party to acquire sufficient rights in a mortgage to qualify to foreclose:
Where a pool of mortgages is assigned to a securitized trust, the executed agreement that assigns the pool of mortgages, with a schedule of the pooled mortgage loans that clearly and specifically identifies the mortgage at issue as among those assigned, may suffice to establish the trustee as the mortgage holder.
Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 651.
With this in mind, the defendants introduced into evidence at trial all of the agreements tracking the transfer of Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan from its originator, First NLC Financial Services, LLC (“First NLC”), to Deutsche, complete with the necessary schedules of the pooled mortgage loans specifically identifying her mortgage as being among those transferred. The defendants argue that these agreements, together with other evidence introduced by them, establish that Deutsche was the holder of the mortgage well in advance of the first publication of the notice of sale.
At trial, Ronaldo Reyes, a Deutsche vice president, testified that he had management responsibility over the administration of the Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4 (the “Trust”) and that Deutsche had always been the trustee of the Trust. He testified that in his capacity as vice president he had access to the books and records of the Trust and was qualified to authenticate and testify about the documents admitted into evidence by the defendants. During the course of his testimony, Mr. Reyes authenticated executed copies of each of the agreements discussed below, and demonstrated that Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was included on the mortgage loan schedules attached as exhibits to several of the agreements. Mr. Reyes testified that each was used in the ordinary course of Deutsche’s business as trustee of the Trust.
The following documents were admitted into evidence: (i) the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home; (ii) the original promissory note executed by Ms. Schwartz, which Mr. Reyes noted was endorsed in blank by First NLC; (iii) the Amended and Restated Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement (the “Loan Purchase Agreement”) dated as of September 1, 2005 by and between Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital, Inc. (“MS Mortgage Capital”) and First NLC; (iv) the Assignment and Conveyance Agreement dated September 29, 2005, by and between First NLC and MS Mortgage Capital; (v) the Bill of Sale dated November 29, 2005 by and between MS Mortgage Capital and Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. (“MS ABS Capital”); and (vi) the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the “PSA”) dated as of November 1, 2005 by and among MS ABS Capital, HomEq Servicing Corporation, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, First NLC, LaSalle Bank National Association and Deutsche. Mr. Reyes also testified regarding a custodial log that was admitted into evidence for the purpose of proving that Ms. Schwartz’s loan documents were in Deutsche’s custody prior to the date when the first notice of foreclosure sale was published.
Findings of Fact2
1. On July 22, 2005, Ms. Schwartz refinanced the mortgage loan on her property at 23 Sigel Street, Worcester, Massachusetts, executing a promissory note in the amount of $272,000 payable to First NLC and a mortgage securing her obligation under the note naming MERS, solely as nominee for First NLC, its successors and assigns, as mortgagee.
2. The mortgage, which was duly recorded at the Worcester District Registry of Deeds, includes the statutory power of sale under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch 183, § 21 which is invoked by reference to the statute and which permits a mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage by public auction sale of the property upon the mortgagor’s default in performance or breach of any conditions thereof.
3. On May 3, May 10 and May 17, 2006, a notice of foreclosure sale was published in the Worcester Telegram and Gazette stating that “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee,” the “present holder” of the mortgage, intended to foreclose the mortgage by public sale of Ms. Schwartz’s property on May 24, 2006.
4. On May 23, 2006, Liquenda Allotey, described as a vice president of MERS, executed an Assignment of Mortgage for the purpose of assigning the mortgage from MERS to “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee.”
5. Deutsche, in its capacity as trustee of the Trust,3 conducted the foreclosure sale as scheduled on May 24, 2006, bid in its mortgage debt and purchased the property.
6. In its answer, Deutsche admitted that a foreclosure deed conveying the property to itself was recorded on October 13, 2006. There has been no evidence presented of any subsequent conveyance of the property and hence I find that Deutsche remains the record owner of the Sigel Street property.
7. As she testified on the first day of trial, Ms. Schwartz continues to reside in the Sigel Street Property.
8. The original promissory note executed by Ms. Schwartz was endorsed in blank by an officer of First NLC.
9. The original mortgagee as identified in the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home was MERS, as nominee for First NLC, its successors and assigns.
10. In accordance with Section 2 of the Loan Purchase Agreement, First NLC agreed to sell “Mortgage Loans” to MS Mortgage Capital.
11. The Loan Purchase Agreement defines a “Mortgage Loan” as
An individual Mortgage Loan which is the subject of this Agreement, each Mortgage Loan originally sold and subject to this Agreement being identified on the applicable Mortgage Loan Schedule, which Mortgage Loan includes without limitation the Mortgage File, the Monthly Payments, Principal Prepayments, Liquidation Proceeds, Condemnation Proceeds, Insurance Proceeds, Servicing Rights and all other rights, benefits, proceeds and obligations arising from or in connection with such Mortgage Loan, excluding replaced or repurchased mortgage loans.
12. On September 29, 2005, by way of the Assignment and Conveyance Agreement, First NLC sold, transferred, assigned, set over and conveyed to MS Mortgage Capital “all right, title and interest of, in and to the Mortgage Loans listed on the Mortgage Loan Schedule attached hereto as Exhibit A.”
13. Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was listed on the exhibit attached to the Assignment and Conveyance Agreement.
14. First NLC, therefore, transferred all of its right, title and interest in Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan to MS Mortgage Capital on November 29, 2005.
15. By the Bill of Sale dated November 29, 2005, MS Mortgage Capital, as the “Seller,” transferred to MS ABS Capital “all the Seller’s right, title and interest in and to the Mortgage Loans described on Exhibit A attached hereto.”
16. Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was listed on Exhibit A to the Bill of Sale.
17. MS Mortgage Capital, therefore, transferred its entire interest in Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan to MS ABS Capital on November 29, 2005.
18. Section 2.01 of the PSA, which was dated November 1, 2005, provides that the MS ABS Capital, as “Depositor,”
concurrently with the execution and delivery hereof, hereby sells, transfers, assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to [Deutsche] for the benefit of the Certificateholders, without recourse, all the right, title and interest of the Depositor in and to the Trust Fund, and the Trustee, on behalf of the Trust, hereby accepts the Trust Fund.
19. The “Trust Fund” includes all of the mortgage loans listed on an attached mortgage loan schedule.
20. Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was listed on the mortgage loan schedule attached to the PSA.
21. While the PSA provides that the mortgage loans were transferred from MS ABS Capital to Deutsche, “concurrently with the execution and delivery hereof” on November 1, 2005, the Bill of Sale provides that MS ABS Capital did not acquire the mortgage loans until November 29, 2005. The November 2009 PSA indicates, however, that the transaction in which MS ABS Capital would transfer the loans to Deutsch, as trustee of the Trust, would not be consummated until November 29, 2005, which is defined as the “Closing Date.” Therefore, MS ABS Capital transferred Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan to Deutsche, as trustee of the Trust, on the Closing Date of November 29, 2005, which is the same date as the Bill of Sale by which MS ABS Capital acquired the loan from MS Mortgage Capital.
22. Section 2.01(b) of the PSA provides that if
any Mortgage has been recorded in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (“MERS”) or its designee, no Assignment of Mortgage in favor of the Trustee will be required to be prepared or delivered and instead, the applicable Servicer shall take all reasonable actions as are necessary at the expense of the applicable Originator to the extent permitted under the related Purchase Agreement and otherwise at the expense of the Depositor to cause the Trust to be shown as the owner of the related Mortgage Loan on the records of MERS for the purpose of the system of recording transfers of beneficial ownership of mortgages maintained by MERS.
23. Thus MS ABS Capital did not assign to Deutsche the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home in connection with the transaction through which it transferred Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan pursuant to the PSA.
24. In the chain of transactions by which Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was sold, initially by First NLC to MS Mortgage Capital, next by MS Mortgage Capital to MS ABS Capital and finally by MS ABS Capital to Deutsche, the seller sold all of its right, title and interest in the mortgage loans being transferred. However, as the mortgage itself was originally in the name of MERS as mortgagee, and not First NLC, First NLC never held legal title to the mortgage and could not have transferred such title to MS Mortgage Capital. Consequently, neither MS ABS Capital nor Deutsche, as successors to First NLC and MS Mortgage Capital, obtained legal title to the mortgage. This is consistent with § 2.01 of the PSA quoted above.
25. As of November 29, 2005, the Closing Date defined in the PSA, MERS continued to hold legal title to the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home as nominee for First NLC, its successors and assigns.
26. MERS continued to hold legal title to the mortgage until May 23, 2006, when it assigned the mortgage to Deutsche.
27. The custodial log establishes that Deutsche received Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan documents, including the promissory note and mortgage instrument, on September 15, 2005 (presumably in anticipation of the November loan sale), and retained custody of these documents until March 27, 2006, when they were sent to HomEq. The custodial log indicates that the documents were sent to HomEq for servicing and lists the reason for the transfer as “foreclosure.” According to the custodial log, the loan documents were returned to Deutsche on May 24, 2006, the day of the foreclosure sale.
Conclusions of Law
In In re Marron, 2011 WL 2600543, at *5 (Bankr. D. Mass. June 29, 2011), I held that where a loan was secured by a mortgage in the name of MERS, even when the loan itself changed hands several times, MERS remained the mortgagee in its capacity as nominee for the original lender, its successors and assigns.4 As MERS was the mortgagee, it had the authority to assign the mortgage to the foreclosing entity. In this case too, while Ms. Schwartz’s loan passed from hand to hand, MERS remained the mortgagee throughout. While MERS held only bare legal title to the mortgage on behalf of Deutsche, the successor to First NLC, until it assigned the mortgage to Deutsche on May 23, 2006, only MERS had the authority to foreclose.
Having determined that MERS, and not Deutsche, held legal title to the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home mortgage as of May 3, 2006, when the notice of the foreclosure sale of her home was first published, it follows that Deutsche did not have the right to exercise the statutory power of sale and to foreclose the mortgage. See, e.g., Novastar Mortgage, Inc. v. Safran, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 1124, 948 N.E.2d 917 (2011) (finding, in a post-foreclosure eviction proceeding, that the foreclosing entity had the burden to prove its title to the property by establishing that the mortgage had been assigned to it by MERS “at the critical stages of the foreclosure process.”). By publishing notice of the foreclosure sale when it was not the mortgagee, Deutsche failed to comply with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14, and thus its foreclosure sale is void. Ibanez, 438 Mass. at 646-47.5 A declaratory judgment to that effect shall enter on count I of the complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1. The complaint is unclear as to the relief Ms. Schwartz seeks as a result of the allegedly invalid foreclosure. In addition to the allegation that the defendants did not own the mortgage, Ms. Schwartz alleges that she was damaged by the foreclosure sale, which “was conducted fraudulently, in bad faith” and to her detriment. I previously found that Ms. Schwartz failed to produce any evidence of the defendants’ intent to defraud her. In addition, Ms. Schwartz failed to establish the extent of her damages or that the foreclosure sale was conducted in bad faith. Though Ms. Schwartz does not expressly request a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the foreclosure, based on the allegation of invalidity in the complaint, and the parties’ arguments in the course of trial, I will consider count I of the complaint to be a request for a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure sale was invalid.
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2. Any finding of fact which should more properly be considered a conclusion of law, and vice versa, shall be deemed as such.
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3. The documents pertaining to the foreclosure sale identify Deutsche as “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee” without identifying the trust.
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4. The sophisticated financial minds who wrought the MERS regime sought to simplify the process of repeatedly transferring mortgage loans by obviating the need and expense of recording mortgage assignments with each transfer. No doubt they failed to consider the possibility of a collapse of the residential real estate market, the ensuing flood of foreclosures and the intervention of state and federal courts. Professor Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University has observed “[t]he law of unintended consequences is when a simple system tries to regulate a complex system.” Alex Tabarrok, The Law of Unintended Consequences, Marginal Revolution (Jan. 24, 2008, 7:47 am), http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2008/01/the-law-of-unin.html.
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5. Deutsche presented sufficient evidence to prove that either it or HomEq, its agent, had possession of both the Schwartz mortgage and promissory note as of May 3, 2011. The note was endorsed in blank, which gave Deutsche the right to enforce the note. The fact that Deutsche had possession of the mortgage, however, is irrelevant to its status as mortgagee. While a promissory note endorsed in blank may be enforced by the party in possession of the note, this is not the case with a mortgage“Like a sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that requires a writing signed by the grantor.” Ibanez, 458 Mass at 649. Deutsche had not received a written assignment of the mortgage from MERS prior to May 3, 2011. The fact that it had possession of the mortgage instrument did not render Deutsche the mortgagee and thus it lacked the power to sell the property.
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2 Responses

  1. Carie
    Like I said in a prior posting, every institution is conspiring to either protect the banks and their agents and “surrogates” from criminal liability outright, or to pretend their friends are noble captains of industry keeping us from a new Dark Ages…..

  2. GOVERNMENT COVER-UPS ON UNPRECEDENTED SCALE—AND YOU THINK THEY WON’T DO IT WITH THE “FAKE” MORTGAGES??? THINK AGAIN—AND KEEP FIGHTING!!!
    “…AMY GOODMAN: Under whose authority?
    MATT TAIBBI: Under the authority of the enforcement division. Now, this—there’s no legal authority to do this. And, you know, apparently, according to my sources, this was illegal. You can’t just unilaterally shred any government document, no matter how insignificant. And these are significant law enforcement investigatory files that they were unilaterally destroying…”


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