Saturday, December 18, 2010

SHOW ME THE NOTE

Foreclosure Blocked On
"Show Me the Note" ObjectionTim Cavanaugh | December 5, 2010
In what I believe is the biggest win yet for the "produce the note" movement, a U.S. judge in New Jersey recently blocked a foreclosure attempt by Bank of America, arguing that BoA did not have standing because of problems with its loan documentation.

In her November 16 ruling in the case John T. Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., Chief Judge Judith H. Wizmur of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Camden ruled that BoA (which acquired Countrywide in 2008) could not foreclose on an investment property Kemp owned at 1316 Kings Highway, Haddon Heights, because Countrywide never delivered the mortgage note to its trustee Bank of New York and thus could neither claim to be the noteholder of record nor claim to be acting as a servicer for BoNY.

Wizmur's ruling gets into a level of minutiae that normal people may find daunting. Issues turn, for example, on whether papers correctly name Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. rather than Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP. There are interesting conceptual questions as well, such as whether a trustee could be authorized to collect on a mortgage loan but not, because of confusion about documents, to consider that loan collateralized.

Some things that jump out at me:

* A lost note is not the issue here, and it appears that a properly motivated lender can still put together paperwork demonstrating -- even absent the original note or even (I could be wrong) a facsimile of it -- that somebody is authorized to collect. Countrywide tried to pretend it was that somebody but did not either get itself on record as owner of the original note (which it kept on its own premises, maybe), or properly get the note to BoNY and then act as BoNY's representative.

* Wizmur seems to be trying not to blaze a wide path for deadbeats to use document confusion as an escape from foreclosure. This was a good test case because Kemp acknowledges the debt he owes. ("In his complaint," Wizmur notes, "the debtor does not dispute that he signed the original mortgage documents in question.")

* For other reasons, this was not a good test case. Bank of America/Countrywide tested the court's patience by claiming that it had lost the note and had prepared a replacement note with an allonge (your word of the day, defined by Black's as "[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements"), but then immediately afterward the bank claimed to have found the note and retracted the replacement. Maybe it was honest clerical trouble, but the loan documents required that Countrywide move the note to BoNY, and as a Countrywide rep accidentally testified, it was common practice not to bother. The company gave the impression of being lackadaisical about documents.

* The discussion of whether any of the lenders in this case qualified as "holder," "non-holder in possession" or "non-holder not in possession" (pages 12-19) is, I think, the section future lenders will look to as a guide for getting their ducks in a row prior to foreclosing.

At BankInvestmentConsultant.com, Kate Berry and Jeff Horwitz consider the implications from the testimony of Countrywide official Linda DeMartini, who blew the lid off the practice of keeping mortgage notes in-house rather than delivering them to the trustees:

"It's hard for B of A to back-pedal because she was their witness," [Kemp attorney Bruce] Levitt said. "This case was refreshing because the witness wasn't told how to spin things and actually told the truth. They can't dispute the fact that the note was never transferred because she was testifying proudly that Countrywide always retained the note and would never let it out of their sight. It was unscripted. That's why you won't find other testimony like this; this one slipped through."

There is little doubt that Countrywide was supposed to provide the physical note for Kemp's loan to the trust that purchased it, known as CWABS-2006-8.

In the Securities and Exchange Commission filing for that specific securitization, Countrywide and Bank of New York Mellon both attested that at the time of the trust's formation in 2006, "the Trustee has received … the original Mortgage Note … or, if the original Mortgage Note has been lost or destroyed and not replaced, an original lost note affidavit."

According to the testimony in the Kemp case, Countrywide never transferred the note and instead recreated documents weeks before the date of the hearing in an effort to prove its standing in the case.

Judge Wizmur noted in an exchange with Kaplan that the bank could salvage its position by demonstrating that the transfer of the documents was not legally necessary.

"I'm raising the possibility that the Pooling and Servicing Agreement might contain provisions that would serve to offer Countrywide an out," Wizmur said, suggesting that B of A should comb the 270-page agreement for language suggesting that it was entitled to retain the notes as the trustee's proxy or that transfer at the time of sale was immaterial.

With the caveat that I have regular correspondents who tell me I’m in denial about the apocalyptic implications of the mortgage-note fiasco, I think the “immaterial” argument will have legs. Faced with having to undo a host of foreclosures in process – and even worse, having to interfere with already closed sales of REO property that had been foreclosed with similarly flawed paperwork – some court will come up with a bright line. There’s already a lot of material in this ruling that indicates how banks can handle future challenges to their standing to foreclose.

I just wouldn’t want to be the lawyer who has to figure it all out. Or actually, I would want to be that lawyer, because then I could charge Bank of America – and by extension the American taxpayers – a lot of money.

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Friday, December 17, 2010

WELLS FARGO, PLEASE RETURN THE LITTLE'S HOME IN GREENSBORO, NC FOR CHRISTMAS. HAVE A HEART.

Dear Wells Fargo,

I lost my job in April of 2009 and fell behind in mortgage. I began the modification process in January of 2010. I was never given an answer or correspondence pertaining to my modification. I called several times. Your organization proceeded with foreclosure after 10 months of not giving me an answer. However, once I reported my situation to the banking commissioner Mr. Christ wrote to tell me, in December 2010, I did not qualify for modification based on information he received in January.  Prior to my job lost I never missed a payment and often paid extra.

This home burned down in 2006. While we rebuild I made my payment as though we were living in the home.

I was evicted. Sure there were measures I could have taken. However, Wells Fargo representatives reassured me that they would do everything to keep me in my home. I called even after the sale and was told to present a recession letter. I did instead of redeeming my home in the ten day wait period.

I trusted Wells Fargo to view me as a customer in good standing. I need my home. My income has substantially increased. I am a professional nurse practitioner, married with nine children.   I would love to ask for intervention to return our home for Christmas.  I work full time.  Please look into this matter for me.
Sincerely,

Kim Little
4 Barrett Court
Greensboro, NC
336-339-1163 
smithkwl@yahoo.com

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Thursday, December 16, 2010

AN INCREDIBLE, HONEST, REVEALING POST BY AN ANONYMOUS WELLS FARGO EMPLOYEE. WOW. THANK YOU.

A BLACK HOLE AT WELLS FARGO...WHERE PAPERWORK CONVENIENTLY DISAPPEARS

Hi,

If this is posted, it has be posted anonymously.

Many people seeking loan modifications have difficulty with their paperwork being lost. This rarely happens. The reason their documents go missing is because they are intentionally destroyed in order to prevent a loan modification in circumstances where Wells has a legal obligation to modify a loan. Wells Fargo had a legal obligation under its TARP agreement when it still had 25 billion in Federal money, and still has the obligation as part of its servicing agreements. If Wells has an obligation to modify, but doesn't want to, they have to create a way of rejecting the modification application without there being a record of it. Losing the documents serves this purpose.

Documents are destroyed in "The Black Hole." The people you talk to when you are seeking a loan modification have no knowledge of it. Many of them are temps, lacking experience in loan processing. It never registers with most of them that something strange is going on. The Black Hole is kept completely isolated from Wells Fargo servicing staff. Even if they realize it exists, they have no idea of its location.

Here's how it works. Any document pertaining to a loan modification must pass through The Black Hole. A customer cannot simply submit a document directly to the people working on their modification application. Wells gives customers a fax number to submit their documents to. This fax number goes directly into the Black Hole. If physical documents are sent to a Wells Fargo fulfillment center (known as an FC), they are faxed to the Black Hole by servicing staff. If you send documents directly to a processor working on loan modification, they are forbidden to simply take the documents and work on your application. They must fax them to the black hole. Serving staff are only permitted to communicate with a borrower via telephone or mail using form letters- no email.

The people who work in servicing are completely cut off from The Black Hole. They have never talked to anyone who works there, they have never received any communication from it. Documents go into The Black Hole, sometimes they come out, sometimes they don't. When documents disappear, it's not random.

The following is my belief as to how the Black Hole works. I won't give my reasons behind the belief, because it would be a long explanation. Documents sent to The Black Hole are converted to PDF documents. A software system scans the document, pulling the loan number. With the loan number, the system automatically pulls servicing data- such as payment history, investor info, loan to value at origination, and so on. Another existing software system (an LPS product) identifies the property location and data on the local real estate market. The Black Hole uses this information to make a decision about whether or not it is in the best interest of the lender/servicer to modify the loan.

If you are way upside-down in your house, the lender/servicer may not want to foreclose if they have a risk that they can't saddle the investor with the loss- better modify that loan! What if they can foreclose, pay off the investor, and make money on the equity in the house?- your modification docs might get lost. Depending on who the investor is, they may want to drag things out to make higher servicing fees, or in the case of a government loan, make money by the fees charged for services by third party vendors, vendors in which the servicer has ownership interest. In the case of Wells, this would be RELS. There is nothing that warms the heart of a banker like risk-free fee income. The relationships with LPS and First American should also be given scrutiny.

I think it unlikely The Black Hole is actually in Wells Fargo. They have to keep it separate from their own staff, and separation provides a layer of insulation from discovery in lawsuits. It's likely a service provided by LPS. It's curious that other servicers who are LPS clients have a public record of the same kinds of loan modification document disappearance. My best guess for the name of the LPS product (software) that does this is LPS HAMP Solutions.

Why would Wells do this? Doesn't this sound far-fetched? You have to understand how they think. First, a core element of Wells Fargo corporate culture is what they call "the Wells Fargo swagger." This a polite way of saying that at Wells Fargo corporate, arrogance is a virtue. Legally, this is outside the application of any existing regulatory box. While all of the intent for violations of law are there, there is no precedent for the law having been applied in this way. For example, Wells Fargo knows the O.C.C. could potentially apply Reg B to loan mod applications, but they have never done so. Plus, Reg B fines levied per occurrence. Even if the O.C.C. said that every instance of document destruction is the equivalent of a loan denial, what record is there that it occurred? Wells Fargo staff meets with the O.C.C. bi-weekly. They have an established system for their interaction. All of this falls outside of their established way of interacting. The internal Wells Fargo compliance system is built to serve this existing interaction.

This is why a big corporation like Wells can run circles around regulators, making money all the way. Regulators are under funded and understaffed. Wells makes it easy to do their job with compliance systems that tell the regulators what they want to hear, while they are way out in front of the Federal Government making money on the frontier.

Heid stood up in front of Congress and, in sworn testimony, stated Wells Fargo had 17,000 people working to keep people in their homes. This was false. Using an internal system, I counted them. The total number was a lot less, and this included all of the people in loss mitigation, even all the people whose job it is to foreclose on houses- not keep them in their homes. Just prior to Mark Heid's first appearance before congress in 2010, Wells Fargo converted existing loan fulfillment sites to loan modification- an effort to fluff the numbers - and started converting those fulfillment sites back to loan origination right after his second testimony. Even in the interim between the two congressional appearances, there were fulfillment sites internally listed as loan modifications sites that were at least partially committed to origination. In Wells Fargo's Branch retail fulfillment system, there was (as of June 2010), approximately 6,500 people working in loan origination fulfillment- and creating a new loan is a lot more work than modifying an existing loan. I find Mark Heid's testimony be very difficult to believe. How do we know Wells Fargo is telling the truth when they claim to have modified over half a million mortgages? How can this be independently verified? The compliance agent for the Federal Loan Modification program is Freddie Mac, a company with whom Wells Fargo has old, very close, and very large (hundreds of billions of dollars) relationships. How do we know they are telling the truth about anything?

Anonymous
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AN INCREDIBLE, HONEST, REVEALING POST BY AN ANONYMOUS WELLS FARGO EMPLOYEE. WOW. THANK YOU.

Hi,

If this is posted, it has be posted anonymously.
Many people seeking loan modifications have difficulty with their paperwork being lost. This rarely happens. The reason their documents go missing is because they are intentionally destroyed in order to prevent a loan modification in circumstances where Wells has a legal obligation to modify a loan. Wells Fargo had a legal obligation under its TARP agreement when it still had 25 billion in Federal money, and still has the obligation as part of its servicing agreements. If Wells has an obligation to modify, but doesn't want to, they have to create a way of rejecting the modification application without there being a record of it. Losing the documents serves this purpose.

Documents are destroyed in "The Black Hole." The people you talk to when you are seeking a loan modification have no knowledge of it. Many of them are temps, lacking experience in loan processing. It never registers with most of them that something strange is going on. The Black Hole is kept completely isolated from Wells Fargo servicing staff. Even if they realize it exists, they have no idea of its location.

Here's how it works. Any document pertaining to a loan modification must pass through The Black Hole. A customer cannot simply submit a document directly to the people working on their modification application. Wells gives customers a fax number to submit their documents to. This fax number goes directly into the Black Hole. If physical documents are sent to a Wells Fargo fulfillment center (known as an FC), they are faxed to the Black Hole by servicing staff. If you send documents directly to a processor working on loan modification, they are forbidden to simply take the documents and work on your application. They must fax them to the black hole. Serving staff are only permitted to communicate with a borrower via telephone or mail using form letters- no email.

The people who work in servicing are completely cut off from The Black Hole. They have never talked to anyone who works there, they have never received any communication from it. Documents go into The Black Hole, sometimes they come out, sometimes they don't. When documents disappear, it's not random.

The following is my belief as to how the Black Hole works. I won't give my reasons behind the belief, because it would be a long explanation. Documents sent to The Black Hole are converted to PDF documents. A software system scans the document, pulling the loan number. With the loan number, the system automatically pulls servicing data- such as payment history, investor info, loan to value at origination, and so on. Another existing software system (an LPS product) identifies the property location and data on the local real estate market. The Black Hole uses this information to make a decision about whether or not it is in the best interest of the lender/servicer to modify the loan.

If you are way upside-down in your house, the lender/servicer may not want to foreclose if they have a risk that they can't saddle the investor with the loss- better modify that loan! What if they can foreclose, pay off the investor, and make money on the equity in the house?- your modification docs might get lost. Depending on who the investor is, they may want to drag things out to make higher servicing fees, or in the case of a government loan, make money by the fees charged for services by third party vendors, vendors in which the servicer has ownership interest. In the case of Wells, this would be RELS. There is nothing that warms the heart of a banker like risk-free fee income. The relationships with LPS and First American should also be given scrutiny.

I think it unlikely The Black Hole is actually in Wells Fargo. They have to keep it separate from their own staff, and separation provides a layer of insulation from discovery in lawsuits. It's likely a service provided by LPS. It's curious that other servicers who are LPS clients have a public record of the same kinds of loan modification document disappearance. My best guess for the name of the LPS product (software) that does this is LPS HAMP Solutions.

Why would Wells do this? Doesn't this sound far-fetched? You have to understand how they think. First, a core element of Wells Fargo corporate culture is what they call "the Wells Fargo swagger." This a polite way of saying that at Wells Fargo corporate, arrogance is a virtue. Legally, this is outside the application of any existing regulatory box. While all of the intent for violations of law are there, there is no precedent for the law having been applied in this way.  For example, Wells Fargo knows the O.C.C. could potentially apply Reg B to loan mod applications, but they have never done so. Plus, Reg B fines levied per occurrence. Even if the O.C.C. said that every instance of document destruction is the equivalent of a loan denial, what record is there that it occurred? Wells Fargo staff meets with the O.C.C. bi-weekly. They have an established system for their interaction. All of this falls outside of their established way of interacting. The internal Wells Fargo compliance system is built to serve this existing interaction.

This is why a big corporation like Wells can run circles around regulators, making money all the way. Regulators are under funded and understaffed. Wells makes it easy to do their job with compliance systems that tell the regulators what they want to hear, while they are way out in front of the Federal Government making money on the frontier. 

Wells Fargo's public statements regarding loan modification, as well as on many other subjects, are not credible. Remember the scandal in 2009 about charitable contributions? Earlier this year, Mark Heid stood up in front of Congress and, in sworn testimony, stated Wells Fargo had 17,000 people working to keep people in their homes. This was false. Using an internal system, I counted them. The total number was a lot less, and this included all of the people in loss mitigation, even all the people whose job it is to foreclose on houses- not keep them in their homes. Just prior to Mark Heid's first appearance before congress in 2010, Wells Fargo converted existing loan fulfillment sites to loan modification- an effort to fluff the numbers - and started converting those fulfillment sites back to loan origination right after his second testimony. Even in the interim between the two congressional appearances, there were fulfillment sites internally listed as loan modifications sites that were at least partially committed to origination. In Wells Fargo's Branch retail fulfillment system, there was (as of June 2010), approximately 6,500 people working in loan origination fulfillment- and creating a new loan is a lot more work than modifying an existing loan. I find Mark Heid's testimony be very difficult to believe.  How do we know Wells Fargo is telling the truth when they claim to have modified over half a million mortgages? How can this be independently verified? The compliance agent for the Federal Loan Modification program is Freddie Mac, a company with whom Wells Fargo has old, very close, and very large (hundreds of billions of dollars) relationships. How do we know they are telling the truth about anything?

Anonymous 


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Monday, December 13, 2010

CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT UPDATES

CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT UPDATES

Wells Fargo Overdraft Fee Class Action Lawsuit Bench Trial ...
Wells Fargo Ordered To Pay Over $200 Million In Class Action Lawsuit Over Alleged Unfair and Deceptive Overdraft Fees. In a class action lawsuit filed

Wells Fargo Class Action Defense Cases–Martinez v. Wells Fargo ...
Home > Class Action Court Decisions RESPA/TILA Class Actions > Wells Fargo Class Action Defense Cases–Martinez v. Wells Fargo: Ninth Circuit Court Affirms Dismissal Of Class Action

Hagens Berman > Wells Fargo - Overdraft Fees
Date Filed: October 3, 2008 Court: U.S. District Court Location: Washington Ticker Symbol: WFC Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo claiming that the bank's
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Hagens Berman > Wells Fargo Appraisers
Date Filed: April 14, 2009 Court: U.S. District Court Location: California Ticker Symbol: WFC Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro filed a class-action lawsuit claiming Wells Fargo and its ...

Class Action Suit Accuses Wells Fargo of Discrimination by ...
No one wants to come out and say it, but a number of Republicans have recently indicated that they plan to mount campaigns to seek the party’s 2012 presidential nomination.

Wells Fargo Appraisers Litigation. Class Action Lawsuit - Class ...
Wells Fargo Appraisers Litigation. class action complaint and other relevant pleadings.

Wells Fargo loses class action lawsuit Wells Fargo loses class action lawsuit. Posted: 8:23 pm Wed, August 11, 2010 By Associated Press mddailyrecord.com/2010/08/11/wells-fargo-loses ...

If you are or were a Home Mortgage Consultant employed by Wells Fargo, please read this notice. The decertification of a class action lawsuit may affect your rights.
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All Wells Fargo customers from November 15, 2004, to June 30, 2008, who incurred overdraft fees on debit transactions as a result of the bank's practice of sequencing transactions ...

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MORE CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AGAINST WELLS FARGO

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Wells Fargo loses class action lawsuit
Wells Fargo loses class action lawsuit. Posted: 8:23 pm Wed, August 11, 2010 By Associated Press
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ARE YOU A VICTIM OF WELLS FARGO'S PAIN?: WELLS FARGO CLASS ACTION ...
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Wells Fargo Overtime Wages Class Action
Wells Fargo Overtime Wages Class Action. This website pertains to the Gerlach v. Wells Fargo case, which settled in 2007. The $12,800,000 settlement fund has all been paid out.
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Wells Fargo faces multibillion dollar class action lawsuit - Long ...
Wells Fargo National Bank, the fourth largest bank in the United States, is facing multiple multibillion dollar class action lawsuits for what could be the la
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Wells Fargo Suit Gets Class Action in Los Angeles « HousingWire
[Update 1: Adds statement from Wells Fargo] A lawsuit filed on behalf of minority mortgagors against Wells Fargo (WFC: 30.27 +0.67%) will proceed as a class action case after a Los ...
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Wells Fargo Bank Class Action Suits -- Join!
Consumergripes.net The Law Offices of Daniel Harris is currently investigating Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. The truth is heartbreaking. Please visit with caution (the content will ...
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Wells Fargo Class Action Defense Cases—In re Wells Fargo ...
Home > Multidistrict Litigation Class Action Court Decisions > Wells Fargo Class Action Defense Cases—In re Wells Fargo Mortgage Lending Practices: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict ...
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Bank of America, Wells Fargo Hit With Class Action
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Sunday, December 12, 2010

THE BANKS MAKE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS BY CHARGING UNFAIR FEES, BY TRICKING CUSTOMERS INTO BAD LOANS, BY WRONGFULLY FORECLOSING, THEY GET UPSET WHEN THEY HAVE TO PAY LEGAL FEES TO DEFEND THEIR DIRTY DEEDS, AND ARE FORCED TO BUY BACK THEIR TOXIC LOANS. THIS, THEY SAY, IS WHY THEY MUST CHARGE THEIR CUSTOMERS MORE IN FEES. TRANSPARENCY IS EXPENSIVE.

Bank complaints soar
even after law changes
Overdraft fees, unfair foreclosures are angering customers.

By Pallavi Gogoi
of The Associated Press

NEW YORK — Complaints against banks are soaring, suggesting that new laws and regulations put in place since the financial crisis two years ago aren’t dampening Americans’ anger over overdraft fees and foreclosure practices they view as unfair.

If the trend continues, experts say, it will set banks on a collision course with customers and lead to tougher rules that will hurt their earnings.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency estimates that complaints from customers of the 1,500 banks it regulates will hit 80,000 this year. That would be the highest level in the 15 years it has recorded them and more than double the 2008 total. The Better Business Bureau and state attorneys general also report big increases.

Regulators say the surge has put them on high alert. Both the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. have issued new guidelines, and regulators have hired additional staff as they seek to resolve each complaint. The Fed sought to head off one area of large complaints in November 2009 by prohibiting banks from charging overdraft fees on ATM withdrawals without customers’ consent.

Elizabeth Warren, the Harvard professor chosen by President Obama to set up the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, said she is frustrated with how banks find ways to skirt new laws that ban certain practices. “We need fundamental change that will address the real, underlying issues,” she said in a Dec. 2 speech to the Consumer Federation of America. Consumer safety must trump “deceptive and dangerous innovations,” she said.

Officials at Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & Co. and Citigroup Inc. said they are listening to customers closely and hiring additional staff to deal with problem areas like mortgages.

“Customer relationships are the backbone of banking, and banks (strive) to meet customer demands,” said Peter Garuccio, spokesman for the American Bankers Association.

Complaints about mortgages and foreclosures surged to the top spot this year. The OCC estimates that the number of grievances it will receive about home loans will almost double this year to 36,000 from 19,669 last year. That’s not surprising: Banks are fighting lawsuits over these issues in several states and are being investigated by all 50 state attorneys general on how they conduct foreclosures.

For years, most complaints were over credit cards. People said banks charged excessive fees or jacked up interest rates without warning. Last year, Congress passed sweeping legislation that prohibited card companies from arbitrarily changing rates and limited fees. The changes already are having an effect. While credit cards are still the second-highest complaint category, they now make up just 22 percent of all complaints, down from 37 percent in 2009.

A public outcry about overdraft fees led legislators to place stiff curbs on their use this summer. That came after banks were found to have charged as much as $35 each time a customer with insufficient funds used a debit card to pay for items like a $1 pack of gum or a $4 cup of coffee.

The stepped-up oversight has done little to slow the number of complaints related to overdraft fees on checking accounts. Consumer advocates say that’s because banks process the largest checks or transactions first, allowing them to levy multiple fees on smaller transactions after the checking account empties out.

“This manipulation of transactions leads to a cascading effect of as many as 10 overdraft fees a day,” says Rebecca Borne, senior policy counsel at the nonprofit Center for Responsible Lending, a consumer advocacy group.

FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair took note of these complaints last month. She launched an offensive, asking banks to consider eliminating overdraft fees altogether for small amounts. “Consumers often feel like they’ve been tricked, and that makes them angry,” she said.

Banks have been reluctant to part with the fees because they are extremely lucrative. In 2009, overdraft fees brought in a record $38.5 billion for banks, according to research group Moebs Services. Another $20.5 billion came from credit card penalty fees, according to R.K. Hammer, a credit card consultant.

With the new laws in place, Moebs estimates revenue from overdraft fees will fall to $34 billion this year. Hammer says the new rules will cost the credit card industry $11 billion a year over the next five years. Other things are weighing on banks too. Fighting the lawsuits is expensive, and the people who bought billions of dollars of faulty mortgages are trying to make the banks buy them back.

Consumer advocates say the punitive fees have hurt bank customers by driving them to use payday lenders and pawnshops. But there’s little doubt the banks have been hurting themselves too.

“The culture at banks has been to chase profits at all costs, even if it hurts their customers,” said Paul Miller, head of financial service research at FBR Capital Markets. “Now it’s coming back to bite the banks in the form of new rules.”

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