Banker faced agonizing dilemma
He says he saw ethical issues at Wachovia but feared for his job. Bank disputes his claims.
By Christina Rexrode
crexrode@charlotteobserver.com
Posted: Saturday, Dec. 11, 2010
Robert Kraus is suing Wells Fargo Securities in county court over his departure from the bank in 2006, when he worked in then-Wachovia's investment bank. His departure was set into motion after he "raised serious legal, ethical, and compliance concerns," his suit says. Wachovia says the allegations are without merit. Davie Hinshaw - dhinshaw@charlotteobserver.com
Robert Kraus faced a choice with no good options.
It was early 2006, and Kraus, then 35, had been working nearly a year for Wachovia's investment bank in Charlotte. As a controller, his job was to raise red flags when he saw questionable practices, and he believed he had seen many. But whenever he told his supervisors of his concerns, he says, they told him to keep quiet.
Kraus says Wachovia's investment bank was plagued with systemic problems, such as balance sheets manipulated to hide poor returns and troubled commercial real estate deals that were not fully disclosed to investors. He believed he had a duty to stand up for the rank-and-file employees who would suffer if the investment bank imploded, and the shareholders who bought stock based on the numbers reported to the public.
But he also says he had a sense that the investment banking system was gamed, and that people who tried to question the machine would be destroyed by it. And Kraus, with a young daughter and a second baby on the way, was terrified of losing his job.
If you were Robert Kraus, what would you do?
Kraus, a New York native who graduated from Cornell and NYU, was recruited to Wachovia in 2005, when he was working as a commercial real estate consultant in New York. The executives who interviewed him told him they wanted someone who knew real estate like he did, and who would bring strict oversight to its commercial mortgage-backed securities business, he says.
Kraus says he identified problems in the investment bank almost immediately. Among his allegations: The bank was misrepresenting the value of investment products it was marketing, he says. It wasn't fully disclosing when the commercial real estate properties that it financed were souring, he says, and it would issue contradictory reports on a property's expected losses depending on who the report was for. It would transfer troubled assets to other institutions or between its own trading desks, sometimes for just days or hours, when it needed to get them off the balance sheet, he says.
Wachovia spokeswoman Elise Wilkinson said Kraus' allegations of improper business conduct are "completely without merit" and "simply unfounded."
Kraus took his concerns to his boss, Stephen Nelson, and Nelson's boss, Ira Malter, on numerous occasions. He says that Nelson and Malter consistently told him to drop the matter. He also says they and other executives left him out of projects and meetings, threatened to block his access to loan information and insinuated that his job would be in danger if he kept asking questions.
Nelson and Malter deny any wrongdoing.
"The specifics of Robert Kraus' claim of 'systemic problems' were thoroughly investigated and found to be baseless," Nelson said in a statement to the Observer. "It's unfortunate that my reputation, along with others, is being attacked by these false claims."
Malter said in a statement: "I hold myself and my team members to the highest ethical standards and levels of performance. Robert Kraus' allegations are false and I look forward to them being proven untrue."
Kraus says the problematic loans he identified include Bemis Square, One Oliver Plaza, Doubletree Portfolio, 605 W. 42nd St., Macon & Burlington, Alliance Portfolio, 600 Community Drive, the Dobie Center, CNL and Cobalt. Wilkinson, the bank spokeswoman, declined to comment on the specific loans, but emphasized that Wachovia had investigated all of Kraus' claims and found them to be false.
At work, Kraus grew stressed and frustrated but wasn't sure what to do. One Friday evening, he says, he was working late and found a future-dated performance review on his desk. He says it was visceral and hateful, and he understood the message.
The Observer asked Wachovia for copies of Kraus' performance reviews, which he consented to. The bank refused, saying that personnel files contain private information. Three people who have worked with Kraus outside of Wachovia said they couldn't speak to his experience at the bank, but that they believed him to be trustworthy. Several Wachovia investment bankers contacted by the Observer didn't return calls.
The next Monday, when Kraus was driving to work, he decided to take his concerns to Steve Cummings, the head of the investment bank. He went to Cummings' office that morning, and the two talked for an hour and a half.
Kraus told Cummings he was scared that he would lose his job for raising such questions. According to Kraus, Cummings told him that he had done the right thing, shook his hand and said that, "as a gentleman," he would guarantee that Kraus' job and family weren't in danger if there was any truth to his claims.
"I walked away at that moment feeling a huge burden off my shoulders," Kraus says. "...And that was just when things were going to get crazy."
In the coming weeks, Kraus says, he grew frustrated because he felt that his concerns were still being ignored. He went to Cummings' office a second time, and was escorted from the building by two security guards. He says that no one ever explained why.
Cummings, who left Wachovia when it was bought by Wells Fargo, denied wrongdoing.
"As Robert stated, my office door was open to anyone who had a concern about our business activities with the assurance that such conversations would be taken seriously, investigated and dealt with appropriately," Cummings said. "That was the culture that our senior team endeavored to create within our business unit. I met with him at length to listen to his concerns and then asked the appropriate members of our legal, compliance and finance staff to independently look into the issues that he raised."
Kraus says he was told that he was not fired and would still be paid but was not allowed back into the building. In July 2006, he and his attorney met with members of Wachovia's legal, compliance and internal audit departments.
A couple weeks later, the bank contacted Kraus' attorney and said it had conducted an internal investigation and dismissed all of the issues Kraus had raised.
Kraus has not seen the bank's report on its investigation. According to him, the bank told him that if he asked to see it, he would be fired immediately with no severance, and any prospective employer would be told he had been terminated with cause. Wilkinson, the Wachovia spokeswoman, denies the bank said this. She said she couldn't release the report to Kraus or the Observer because it contained proprietary information.
The bank offered Kraus a severance package worth about three months' salary. The agreement he signed included a waiver releasing the bank from any lawsuits he might file, the bank says.
Kraus says he took the severance, about $50,000, because he didn't know what else to do. His wife, Julie, was pregnant with their second child. He had just closed on an $800,000 house in Union County, and, he says, sunk his life savings into paying down the mortgage loan.
Cummings, the former head of the investment bank, said he was sorry that Kraus "has chosen to raise these issues once again," after Wachovia already investigated his claims. Cummings said he was "confident that, if and when the full story is told, his claims will be shown to be inaccurate and his case will be dismissed."
The investment bank spirals
In Wachovia's annual report for 2005, the year Kraus came to the bank, then-chief executive Ken Thompson told shareholders he had "ambitious growth plans" for the investment bank and praised its record earnings.
The unit carried weight within Wachovia. In 2006, the investment bank housed just 5percent of the employees but churned out 22 percent of the revenue.
Things started spiraling in 2007. Wachovia's investment bank, like many of its peers, started losing money and laying off workers. The following year, Thompson was dismissed as CEO. His chief risk officer and chief financial officer also left the bank.
After ousting Thompson, Wachovia hired Goldman Sachs to review its loan portfolios. Analysts including Dick Bove said the move sent a troubling message about the Wachovia investment bank and its ability to analyze bad loans.
That September, Wachovia nearly collapsed, in large part because of bad home loans but also because of problems in the investment bank. In the last 12 months before the bank announced it would be bought, it wrote down $7.2 billion in troubled loans. Of those, $4.5 billion were in the investment bank.
Cummings said the Wachovia investment bank's losses were better than many of its peers', relative to market share. "Yes, we had losses," he said, "but every other firm in the industry had losses given the financial crisis we went through."
In early October 2008, San Francisco-based Wells Fargo agreed to buy the struggling Wachovia.
Cummings left Wachovia after the bank was bought. Regulatory filings show he was eligible for $14.3 million in severance pay.
'It's not an accidental cover'
Kraus has been mostly out of work since he left Wachovia. Unable to make his monthly house payments, he sent Wells Fargo a hardship letter in July asking for a mortgage modification. In it, he detailed his allegations about the investment bank and how he left.
A month later, the bank offered to defer about 75 percent of his remaining mortgage loan until 2050, an extremely unusual and generous modification offer. His monthly payment now is about $1,000, including taxes and insurance, he says, compared to $3,400 before the modification.
Wells Fargo, asked to comment on the uncommon nature of Kraus' mortgage modification, released this statement: "Wells Fargo Home Mortgage has made more than 577,000 loan modifications for homeowners and each case is unique. We consider a range of individual criteria that is consistent with regulatory guidelines."
According to Kraus, an official in Wells Fargo's office of the president also told him the bank believed he had been wrongfully terminated and that the internal report dismissing his claims did not appear to exist. Wilkinson, the bank spokeswoman, denies that Wells Fargo said this.
Kraus says he's thankful for the mortgage workout but that Wells Fargo didn't offer what he really wanted - his name cleared. He says the bank got rid of him because he spoke up and was a threat to the big money being made in investment banking.
"There appears to be accountability but it's a cover, and it's not an accidental cover," he says. "It's done by smart people at the top and pretty smart people in the middle who aspire to be at the top."
Kraus says he believes the investment banking system is rigged, and a culprit in the nation's economic crisis. When things fall apart, the ones who suffer are the shareholders who lose their savings, the borrowers who lose their houses and the low-level workers who lose their jobs, he says.
"Show me any other event in the history of people that has been so damaging," Kraus says. "The argument that no one saw this coming is a lie."
Kraus sued Wells Fargo in October, alleging fraud and misrepresentation.
Wilkinson, the bank spokeswoman, said Kraus' claim that he was forced out for raising questions was "completely untrue."
"Wachovia policy expressly prohibited retaliation against any employee who in good faith brought forward information about possible violations, even where, as in this case, they had no merit," she said.
Wells Fargo has filed a motion to dismiss Kraus' lawsuit, arguing he has no right to sue because of the severance agreement he signed. The motion does not address the substance of his allegations against the investment bank.
Kraus says he believes his severance agreement was nullified when he was told he was wrongfully terminated.
'A really, really horrible ride'
In the past four years, Kraus has struggled to make ends meet and believes he's been blacklisted from Charlotte's investment banking community. He has maxed out his credit cards, cashed in retirement savings and worked as a night security guard at a business park. His brother pays his phone bill; other relatives help pay for lessons and other expenses for his children. He did some contract work this year for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., examining failed banks, but now he's considering getting a job as an airport baggage handler. His marriage, stressed by four years without his income, is in tatters.
Julie Kraus said her husband was happy when he got the Wachovia job, and saw it as a way to get the family out of New York and work for a good company. She watched his mood change after he started, when he came home frustrated.
"I think Rob was very bold and he probably went places that most people won't go," Julie Kraus says. But the fallout on their family has been debilitating, she said: "It's been a really, really horrible ride."
Robert Kraus believes that many other bankers have the same concerns that he did but stay quiet because they see what happens to the few who try to challenge the system.
"When you ask people about ethics, which way do you expect people to go?" he says. "To choose something that is self-destructive, which will end your career, which will end your future, which will destroy your family with no upside? Or, do you work within a system that has proven itself to be very, very, very successful for those people in the system?"
What bothers him the most, he says, isn't what happened to him. It's that there has been no real reckoning, no significant accountability for the people most responsible for the financial meltdown.
"The same people, the same rules," Kraus says. "Nothing's changed."
Kraus says he'd do the same thing again - press his bosses to address questionable practices in the investment bank. He's glad that he won't have to one day tell his kids that he ignored his convictions about right and wrong.
But he does wish he had never taken the job at Wachovia, or gone into banking in the first place.
He wishes, he says, that he had been a schoolteacher, or maybe a pediatrician.
Christina Rexrode: 704-358-5170
Sunday, December 12, 2010
Friday, December 10, 2010
JUDGE DENIES WELLS FARGO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A Foreclosure Fiasco:
The Case of
Tandala Mims v. Wells Fargo
By ABIGAIL FIELD
Posted 8:00 AM 12/07/10 Company News, Columns, People, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo & Co, Real
The banks' constant refrain during this mortgage mess is that the paperwork issues are mere technicalities -- nothing to be concerned about. The documents are all true, they assert, we just didn't honor the proper procedures.
But it doesn't take much digging into the issue to find a case like that of Tandala Mims of New York, which calls into question the whole foreclosure process and the systems that support it.
In Mims's case, which will be argued again on Thursday, her lawyer, consumer bankruptcy attorney Linda Tirelli, argues that Wells Fargo (WFC) should not be able to foreclose during Mims's bankruptcy because the bank's documents claiming ownership of the mortgage appear to be false in several ways.
To foreclose, Wells Fargo will have to prove to the bankruptcy judge that it has the legal right to -- that it has "standing" -- because either it owns the loan or it's representing the entity that does. Wells tried to prove standing once, but the judge wasn't convinced, ruling against Wells on Oct. 27. At that point, Wells had produced a note and an assignment of mortgage, both of which were deeply flawed documents.
Wells Fargo Documents, Take One
The first note Wells introduced showed that Mims originally owed her mortgage debt to a company called Lend America, which then transferred the note to Washington Mutual. Let's remember: JPMorgan Chase (JPM), not Wells Fargo, bought Washington Mutual. Nothing in Wells's documents showed how it ended up with the note -- nor was there any indication that the note had been transferred to JPMorgan.
Similarly problematic was the paper purporting to assign the mortgage to Wells. That document says Lend America assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo, which on its face is odd. If the note belonged to Washington Mutual as it indicated, the mortgage should have been WaMu's to assign. After all, the general rule is the "mortgage follows the note." Worse, Lend America appears to be out of business, as Tirelli's motion details. So even if it somehow retained the mortgage after transferring the note, it's hard to understand how Lend America is assigning anything these days.
Not to worry, Wells Fargo may say: The assignment occurred through the magic of MERS -- Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, the tracking database firm named on some 60% of mortgages today.
Specifically, MERS was named on the original mortgage as Lend America's nominee, and John Kennerty, a Wells Fargo employee and known robo-signer, used his additional authority as a MERS "certifying officer" to assign the mortgage to Wells. An obvious conflict of interest exists when Wells Fargo is essentially assigning a mortgage to itself to prove its right to foreclose. But the fact that Kennerty signed as nominee for Lend America also suggests that the MERS database didn't keep up with what happened to Mims's mortgage and note because again, Kennerty -- or better yet, a MERS "officer" who doesn't work for Wells Fargo -- should be signing as a nominee for JPMorgan Chase.
In any case, Wells Fargo failed to convince the judge it had the right to foreclose, so it submitted another round of documents to prove standing.
Wells Fargo Documents, Take Two
The second time around, Wells filed a note that showed Washington Mutual endorsing it "in blank." The blank endorsement, if real, would give whoever is holding the "new" note rights in it. This endorsement, however, is problematic. When did it appear on the note? After all, Wells certified that the note without the in-blank endorsement that it first submitted was a "true and accurate cop[y] of the original document" as of Sept. 16, 2010. If the endorsement was added after that point, Wells should have asked the court's permission before adding it.
But if the endorsement is to be believed, it has to be several years old. As Tirelli points out, the WaMu entity supposedly endorsing the note ceased to exist years ago, and WaMu in any form went out of business a few years later. If the "new" note is a real copy of the original -- meaning the endorsement was done when that old version of WaMu existed -- then that version has been in existence for years, and the "old" note Wells first submitted must be quite old indeed.
So why did Wells think the first version was a true and accurate copy of the original? What research does Wells do before certifying the documents it submits to court?
Unfortunately, the idea that the two notes submitted are just snapshots of the same original at different times, with the older one accidentally being submitted to court the first time, just isn't credible. The discrepancies between the two go way beyond the endorsement. Tirelli points out that:
there are hole punch marks on the Mims I Note which do not appear on the Mims II Note. There is a bar code on the top of the Mims I Note not present at the top of the Mims II Note and a barcode at the bottom of the Mims II Note not present on the Mims I Note. There are what appear to be blackened permanent marker cross-out items which do not match as between the documents. There appear to be [check] marks throughout the body of the Mims I Note which do not appear on the Mims II Note. The size of the font [on each] also appears different...
I'd like to hear how Wells explains those differences.
As to the assignment, Wells made no substantive changes but submitted documents claiming to support what Kennerty did on behalf of MERS. Tirelli points out that if the loan is researched on the MERS site, Wells is identified as the loan's servicer, and some unnamed "investor" that chose not to reveal itself in the database as the owner. While that suggests some mystery investor has the right to foreclose, it equally suggests that Wells doesn't -- at least not in its own name. I wonder if the investor knows that Wells is trying to do just that?
I can't wait to see what the judge makes of this situation. (The Wells denied Wells Motion for Summary Judgment!)
The Case of
Tandala Mims v. Wells Fargo
By ABIGAIL FIELD
Posted 8:00 AM 12/07/10 Company News, Columns, People, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo & Co, Real
The banks' constant refrain during this mortgage mess is that the paperwork issues are mere technicalities -- nothing to be concerned about. The documents are all true, they assert, we just didn't honor the proper procedures.
But it doesn't take much digging into the issue to find a case like that of Tandala Mims of New York, which calls into question the whole foreclosure process and the systems that support it.
In Mims's case, which will be argued again on Thursday, her lawyer, consumer bankruptcy attorney Linda Tirelli, argues that Wells Fargo (WFC) should not be able to foreclose during Mims's bankruptcy because the bank's documents claiming ownership of the mortgage appear to be false in several ways.
To foreclose, Wells Fargo will have to prove to the bankruptcy judge that it has the legal right to -- that it has "standing" -- because either it owns the loan or it's representing the entity that does. Wells tried to prove standing once, but the judge wasn't convinced, ruling against Wells on Oct. 27. At that point, Wells had produced a note and an assignment of mortgage, both of which were deeply flawed documents.
Wells Fargo Documents, Take One
The first note Wells introduced showed that Mims originally owed her mortgage debt to a company called Lend America, which then transferred the note to Washington Mutual. Let's remember: JPMorgan Chase (JPM), not Wells Fargo, bought Washington Mutual. Nothing in Wells's documents showed how it ended up with the note -- nor was there any indication that the note had been transferred to JPMorgan.
Similarly problematic was the paper purporting to assign the mortgage to Wells. That document says Lend America assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo, which on its face is odd. If the note belonged to Washington Mutual as it indicated, the mortgage should have been WaMu's to assign. After all, the general rule is the "mortgage follows the note." Worse, Lend America appears to be out of business, as Tirelli's motion details. So even if it somehow retained the mortgage after transferring the note, it's hard to understand how Lend America is assigning anything these days.
Not to worry, Wells Fargo may say: The assignment occurred through the magic of MERS -- Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, the tracking database firm named on some 60% of mortgages today.
Specifically, MERS was named on the original mortgage as Lend America's nominee, and John Kennerty, a Wells Fargo employee and known robo-signer, used his additional authority as a MERS "certifying officer" to assign the mortgage to Wells. An obvious conflict of interest exists when Wells Fargo is essentially assigning a mortgage to itself to prove its right to foreclose. But the fact that Kennerty signed as nominee for Lend America also suggests that the MERS database didn't keep up with what happened to Mims's mortgage and note because again, Kennerty -- or better yet, a MERS "officer" who doesn't work for Wells Fargo -- should be signing as a nominee for JPMorgan Chase.
In any case, Wells Fargo failed to convince the judge it had the right to foreclose, so it submitted another round of documents to prove standing.
Wells Fargo Documents, Take Two
The second time around, Wells filed a note that showed Washington Mutual endorsing it "in blank." The blank endorsement, if real, would give whoever is holding the "new" note rights in it. This endorsement, however, is problematic. When did it appear on the note? After all, Wells certified that the note without the in-blank endorsement that it first submitted was a "true and accurate cop[y] of the original document" as of Sept. 16, 2010. If the endorsement was added after that point, Wells should have asked the court's permission before adding it.
But if the endorsement is to be believed, it has to be several years old. As Tirelli points out, the WaMu entity supposedly endorsing the note ceased to exist years ago, and WaMu in any form went out of business a few years later. If the "new" note is a real copy of the original -- meaning the endorsement was done when that old version of WaMu existed -- then that version has been in existence for years, and the "old" note Wells first submitted must be quite old indeed.
So why did Wells think the first version was a true and accurate copy of the original? What research does Wells do before certifying the documents it submits to court?
Unfortunately, the idea that the two notes submitted are just snapshots of the same original at different times, with the older one accidentally being submitted to court the first time, just isn't credible. The discrepancies between the two go way beyond the endorsement. Tirelli points out that:
there are hole punch marks on the Mims I Note which do not appear on the Mims II Note. There is a bar code on the top of the Mims I Note not present at the top of the Mims II Note and a barcode at the bottom of the Mims II Note not present on the Mims I Note. There are what appear to be blackened permanent marker cross-out items which do not match as between the documents. There appear to be [check] marks throughout the body of the Mims I Note which do not appear on the Mims II Note. The size of the font [on each] also appears different...
I'd like to hear how Wells explains those differences.
As to the assignment, Wells made no substantive changes but submitted documents claiming to support what Kennerty did on behalf of MERS. Tirelli points out that if the loan is researched on the MERS site, Wells is identified as the loan's servicer, and some unnamed "investor" that chose not to reveal itself in the database as the owner. While that suggests some mystery investor has the right to foreclose, it equally suggests that Wells doesn't -- at least not in its own name. I wonder if the investor knows that Wells is trying to do just that?
I can't wait to see what the judge makes of this situation. (The Wells denied Wells Motion for Summary Judgment!)
FRAUD DIGEST PROVIDES AN EASY WAY TO KEEP UP WITH LATEST LENDER FRAUD VIOLATIONS
AMERICA'S SERVICING COMPANY
LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
Action Date: October 7, 2010
Location: Palm Beach County, FL
WHY WELLS FARGO MUST BE ORDERED TO STOP ITS FORECLOSURES.
While other banks have acknowledged some problems and halted some foreclosures, Wells Fargo has issued self-serving statements and forged ahead.
Why should Wells Fargo be ordered to stop its foreclosures?
First, Wells Fargo's foreclosure mill, America's Servicing Company, and its robo-signers John Herman Kennerty, China Brown, Heather Carrico, Natasha Clark and others signed thousands of documents each month with no knowledge of the truth of the matters set forth for the courts in those documents. The sheer volume of the documents signed by Kennerty should be enough to convince any court that Kennerty had no knowledge of the facts.
A court in Brooklyn found a case where Kennerty's signature was notarized, but actually did not appear on the document. The notary was mindlessly signing a stack of documents. Which law firms are submitting the Affidavits in Florida for Wells Fargo? Florida Default Law Group and the Law Offices of David Stern, two of the law firms under investigation by the Florida Attorney General.
Second, Wells Fargo used Docx in Alpharetta, Georgia to produce mortgage assignments used in thousands of Wells Fargo foreclosures. Many different employees signed the name "Linda Green" on these documents. (For three examples of mortgage assignments used by Wells Fargo, click on the "Pleadings" section of this website - no sign-on is necessary.)
Despite the statements of Lender Processing Services to the contrary, Docx "Linda Green" Affidavits - with many versions of the Linda Green signature - continued to appear in Wells Fargo cases well into 2009. Examples are also in the Pleadings Section. The Perry Affidavit was signed July 10, 2008, but notarized January 15, 2009. The Carrerra Affidavit was signed in January 2008, but notarized in January, 2009.
On these few examples, Linda Green is identified as the Vice President of Wells Fargo bank, the Vice President of Sand Canyon Mortgage and the Vice President of American Home Mortgage Servicing. Most are notarized by the same notary, Brittany Snow, who says she has personal knowledge that Linda Green is
Vice President of these many entities.
In the first quarter of 2010, Wells Fargo filed 1,117 foreclosure actions in Palm Beach County. In the second quarter, Wells Fargo filed 920 foreclosures in Palm Beach County. In the third quarter, Wells Fargo filed 847 foreclosures.
In the vast majority of these foreclosures, Wells Fargo is acting as a trustee for a mortgage-backed securitized trust that cannot even prove that it acquired the mortgages without relying on the Linda Green and John Kennerty documents.
This is not the time to stonewall. THE FDIC AND OCC, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY AND THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING NEED TO STOP THE WELLS FARGO FORECLOSURES.
LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
Action Date: October 7, 2010
Location: Palm Beach County, FL
WHY WELLS FARGO MUST BE ORDERED TO STOP ITS FORECLOSURES.
While other banks have acknowledged some problems and halted some foreclosures, Wells Fargo has issued self-serving statements and forged ahead.
Why should Wells Fargo be ordered to stop its foreclosures?
First, Wells Fargo's foreclosure mill, America's Servicing Company, and its robo-signers John Herman Kennerty, China Brown, Heather Carrico, Natasha Clark and others signed thousands of documents each month with no knowledge of the truth of the matters set forth for the courts in those documents. The sheer volume of the documents signed by Kennerty should be enough to convince any court that Kennerty had no knowledge of the facts.
A court in Brooklyn found a case where Kennerty's signature was notarized, but actually did not appear on the document. The notary was mindlessly signing a stack of documents. Which law firms are submitting the Affidavits in Florida for Wells Fargo? Florida Default Law Group and the Law Offices of David Stern, two of the law firms under investigation by the Florida Attorney General.
Second, Wells Fargo used Docx in Alpharetta, Georgia to produce mortgage assignments used in thousands of Wells Fargo foreclosures. Many different employees signed the name "Linda Green" on these documents. (For three examples of mortgage assignments used by Wells Fargo, click on the "Pleadings" section of this website - no sign-on is necessary.)
Despite the statements of Lender Processing Services to the contrary, Docx "Linda Green" Affidavits - with many versions of the Linda Green signature - continued to appear in Wells Fargo cases well into 2009. Examples are also in the Pleadings Section. The Perry Affidavit was signed July 10, 2008, but notarized January 15, 2009. The Carrerra Affidavit was signed in January 2008, but notarized in January, 2009.
On these few examples, Linda Green is identified as the Vice President of Wells Fargo bank, the Vice President of Sand Canyon Mortgage and the Vice President of American Home Mortgage Servicing. Most are notarized by the same notary, Brittany Snow, who says she has personal knowledge that Linda Green is
Vice President of these many entities.
In the first quarter of 2010, Wells Fargo filed 1,117 foreclosure actions in Palm Beach County. In the second quarter, Wells Fargo filed 920 foreclosures in Palm Beach County. In the third quarter, Wells Fargo filed 847 foreclosures.
In the vast majority of these foreclosures, Wells Fargo is acting as a trustee for a mortgage-backed securitized trust that cannot even prove that it acquired the mortgages without relying on the Linda Green and John Kennerty documents.
This is not the time to stonewall. THE FDIC AND OCC, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY AND THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING NEED TO STOP THE WELLS FARGO FORECLOSURES.
Related articles
- A Foreclosure Fiasco: The Case of Tandala Mims v. Wells Fargo (dailyfinance.com)
- Judge Rejects Wells Fargo Foreclosure Documents Again (dailyfinance.com)
- Homeowner's Lawsuit Against Major Banks Progresses Slowly, Alleges Predatory Lending and Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices by Wells Fargo and Others (prweb.com)
- Special report: Legal woes mount for a foreclosure kingpin (reuters.com)
- Foreclosure King Facing Growing List Of Legal Issues (huffingtonpost.com)
- Moody's may cut Wells Fargo Bank's SQ ratings (marketwatch.com)
Friday, December 3, 2010
JOHN WALSH, ACTING COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, HAS DIRECTED FREDDIE MAC'S BISENIUS AND SERVICERS, TO SUSPEND FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS. CAUGHT IN THEIR WEB OF DECEPTIVE DUAL-TRACK PROCESSES (FINALLY) REGULATORS PRESSED MORTGAGE GUARANTORS TO SUSPEND FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS WHILE DISTRESSED BORROWERS SEEK NEW MORTGAGES.
Fannie, Freddie
Defend Foreclosures Amid Criticism
December 01, 2010, 4:16 PM EST
Bank Regulators May Seek Penalties in Foreclosure Mess
By Lorraine Woellert and Meera Louis
Dec. 1 (Bloomberg) -- Federal regulators and lawmakers pressed mortgage guarantors Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to suspend foreclosure proceedings while distressed borrowers seek new mortgages.
Acting Comptroller of the Currency John Walsh testified at a Senate Banking Committee hearing today that his agency is directing national servicers to suspend foreclosures for borrowers who are actively seeking to qualify for loan modifications.
Dual-track processing is “unnecessarily confusing for distressed homeowners,” Walsh told the committee, which held its second hearing since allegations of shoddy or fraudulent foreclosure practices arose in September.
Government-controlled Fannie and Freddie, taking congressional questions on the dispute for the first time, insisted that borrowers and lenders both benefit from the dual track process of pursuing foreclosure and loan modification at the same time.
Freddie Mac Executive Vice President Donald Bisenius said that the dual-track process minimizes losses, protects communities from blight and ultimately helps borrowers.
‘Drag On’
“It is not in the borrower’s interest for the process to drag on indefinitely,” Bisenius said. “The longer the borrower’s delinquency goes uncured, the farther behind he or she gets, and the harder it becomes to bring the loan current.”
A foreclosure can cost $30 to $40 a day, or as much as $15,000 a year, Bisenius said.
Congress is examining the foreclosure process after Ally Financial Inc.’s GMAC Mortgage unit, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. temporarily halted home seizures in September amid claims that legal documents were mishandled.
State attorneys general and federal regulators are investigating mortgage companies for their reliance on “robo- signers,” employees who signed off on thousands of foreclosure affidavits without reviewing the underlying facts.
At the hearing, lawmakers questioned bank regulators about what actions they have taken to ensure that home seizures are fair and legal. They also criticized dual-track processing as confusing and sometimes unfair.
‘Stonewalled’
“Countless constituents have told us stories of being stonewalled by banks for very long periods of time, of not being told the reasons for their rejection of their modification request, of significant delays caused by banks losing their paperwork, and trial modifications canceled with no rationale,” said Senator Robert Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat. “That just can’t continue to happen.”
Federal Reserve Board Governor Daniel K. Tarullo called the system “literally a race between foreclosure and modification” and called for national standards on loan servicers.
The Fed’s preliminary review of the problem suggests “significant weaknesses” in loan servicing and foreclosures, Tarullo said.
“The problems are sufficiently widespread that they suggest structural problems in the mortgage servicing industry,” he said. “It has now become evident that significant parts of the servicing industry also failed to handle foreclosures properly.”
‘Quite Significant’
The Fed also has told the largest banks to estimate their liability for failed mortgages as part of a capital review, Tarullo said. Investor demands that banks buy back improperly issued mortgages “could be quite significant,” he told the committee.
Attorneys general, consumer advocates and congressional lawmakers have said that problems in the housing system are complicated by the fact that delinquent homeowners seeking to renegotiate their loans through government- or bank-sponsored programs such as the Home Affordable Modification Program are often surprised and confused to discover that their foreclosures haven’t been suspended.
Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and other purchasers of home loans, including the Association of Mortgage Investors, said the dual- track system balances the interests of everyone involved.
“While we believe that borrowers who already are under significant stress arising from their financial situations should not be subjected to needless confusion, we also believe that unnecessary delays in an already lengthy foreclosure process would be counterproductive,” Bisenius said.
His comments were echoed by Terry Edwards, executive vice president at Fannie Mae. The two mortgage companies are controlled by the U.S. government and have been surviving on taxpayer aid since 2008.
Further in Arrears
“The longer the process takes, and the further in arrears the borrower becomes, the less likely it is that the borrower will succeed with a modification and the greater potential there is for loss to Fannie Mae and the U.S. taxpayer,” Edwards said.
The average foreclosure takes 449 days, Bisenius said, which provides sufficient time to explore alternatives. The company and its servicers suspend foreclosures when a loan workout, short sale or other option becomes viable, he said.
Freddie Mac of McLean, Virginia, and its Washington-based rival Fannie Mae purchased or guaranteed 70 percent of new mortgages in the third quarter.
The U.S. Treasury Department took control of the two companies in 2008 after losses on subprime loans pushed them to the brink of collapse. Since then they have drawn more than $150 billion in aid to remain solvent.
--Editors: Maura Reynolds, Lawrence Roberts
To contact the reporters on this story: Lorraine Woellert in Washington at lwoellert@bloomberg.net; Meera Louis in Washington at Mlouis1@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Lawrence Roberts at lroberts13@bloomberg.net.
Defend Foreclosures Amid Criticism
December 01, 2010, 4:16 PM EST
Bank Regulators May Seek Penalties in Foreclosure Mess
By Lorraine Woellert and Meera Louis
Dec. 1 (Bloomberg) -- Federal regulators and lawmakers pressed mortgage guarantors Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to suspend foreclosure proceedings while distressed borrowers seek new mortgages.
Acting Comptroller of the Currency John Walsh testified at a Senate Banking Committee hearing today that his agency is directing national servicers to suspend foreclosures for borrowers who are actively seeking to qualify for loan modifications.
Dual-track processing is “unnecessarily confusing for distressed homeowners,” Walsh told the committee, which held its second hearing since allegations of shoddy or fraudulent foreclosure practices arose in September.
Government-controlled Fannie and Freddie, taking congressional questions on the dispute for the first time, insisted that borrowers and lenders both benefit from the dual track process of pursuing foreclosure and loan modification at the same time.
Freddie Mac Executive Vice President Donald Bisenius said that the dual-track process minimizes losses, protects communities from blight and ultimately helps borrowers.
‘Drag On’
“It is not in the borrower’s interest for the process to drag on indefinitely,” Bisenius said. “The longer the borrower’s delinquency goes uncured, the farther behind he or she gets, and the harder it becomes to bring the loan current.”
A foreclosure can cost $30 to $40 a day, or as much as $15,000 a year, Bisenius said.
Congress is examining the foreclosure process after Ally Financial Inc.’s GMAC Mortgage unit, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. temporarily halted home seizures in September amid claims that legal documents were mishandled.
State attorneys general and federal regulators are investigating mortgage companies for their reliance on “robo- signers,” employees who signed off on thousands of foreclosure affidavits without reviewing the underlying facts.
At the hearing, lawmakers questioned bank regulators about what actions they have taken to ensure that home seizures are fair and legal. They also criticized dual-track processing as confusing and sometimes unfair.
‘Stonewalled’
“Countless constituents have told us stories of being stonewalled by banks for very long periods of time, of not being told the reasons for their rejection of their modification request, of significant delays caused by banks losing their paperwork, and trial modifications canceled with no rationale,” said Senator Robert Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat. “That just can’t continue to happen.”
Federal Reserve Board Governor Daniel K. Tarullo called the system “literally a race between foreclosure and modification” and called for national standards on loan servicers.
The Fed’s preliminary review of the problem suggests “significant weaknesses” in loan servicing and foreclosures, Tarullo said.
“The problems are sufficiently widespread that they suggest structural problems in the mortgage servicing industry,” he said. “It has now become evident that significant parts of the servicing industry also failed to handle foreclosures properly.”
‘Quite Significant’
The Fed also has told the largest banks to estimate their liability for failed mortgages as part of a capital review, Tarullo said. Investor demands that banks buy back improperly issued mortgages “could be quite significant,” he told the committee.
Attorneys general, consumer advocates and congressional lawmakers have said that problems in the housing system are complicated by the fact that delinquent homeowners seeking to renegotiate their loans through government- or bank-sponsored programs such as the Home Affordable Modification Program are often surprised and confused to discover that their foreclosures haven’t been suspended.
Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and other purchasers of home loans, including the Association of Mortgage Investors, said the dual- track system balances the interests of everyone involved.
“While we believe that borrowers who already are under significant stress arising from their financial situations should not be subjected to needless confusion, we also believe that unnecessary delays in an already lengthy foreclosure process would be counterproductive,” Bisenius said.
His comments were echoed by Terry Edwards, executive vice president at Fannie Mae. The two mortgage companies are controlled by the U.S. government and have been surviving on taxpayer aid since 2008.
Further in Arrears
“The longer the process takes, and the further in arrears the borrower becomes, the less likely it is that the borrower will succeed with a modification and the greater potential there is for loss to Fannie Mae and the U.S. taxpayer,” Edwards said.
The average foreclosure takes 449 days, Bisenius said, which provides sufficient time to explore alternatives. The company and its servicers suspend foreclosures when a loan workout, short sale or other option becomes viable, he said.
Freddie Mac of McLean, Virginia, and its Washington-based rival Fannie Mae purchased or guaranteed 70 percent of new mortgages in the third quarter.
The U.S. Treasury Department took control of the two companies in 2008 after losses on subprime loans pushed them to the brink of collapse. Since then they have drawn more than $150 billion in aid to remain solvent.
--Editors: Maura Reynolds, Lawrence Roberts
To contact the reporters on this story: Lorraine Woellert in Washington at lwoellert@bloomberg.net; Meera Louis in Washington at Mlouis1@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Lawrence Roberts at lroberts13@bloomberg.net.
Related articles
- How Do I Know If My Mortgage Loan Is Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac? (thinkup.waldenu.edu)
- UPDATE 4-U.S. sees big costs for banks to fix foreclosures (reuters.com)
- Fannie, Freddie regulator backs two-track process (reuters.com)
- US regulators to be pressed on foreclosure lapses (reuters.com)
Very Interesting. Now Freddie and Fannie (government sponsored enterprises) are blaming the banks and the servicers. Each and every one of them knew what they were doing. Every single player in this drama made millions of dollars and now they want to force buy backs to make more? And the homeowners are sitting in limbo while this stupidity plays out? They've still got the reins. They are going to run into a wall.
Bank Regulators Agree:
The Mortgage Mess Poses Massive Risk
By ABIGAIL FIELD
Posted 4:45 PM 12/01/10 Columns, Economy, Investing, Real Estate
The Senate Banking Committee held its second hearing on problems in mortgage servicing today, and the news is grim.
One key focus of these panels was the risks posed to banks that sold mortgage-backed securities if investors in those securities were able to force the banks to buy them back (also called putbacks). That risk arises from two parallel scenarios that have been explained by the Congressional Oversight panel and elsewhere. The first is that the mortgages put into the securities didn't meet the level of quality that investors were promised. The second is that the securitizations themselves were faulty because the mortgages never got into the securities in the first place.
In his oral testimony, Federal Reserve Board Governor Daniel Tarullo wouldn't quantify the risk to banks posed by forced buybacks, but he said for at least some institutions, particularly "big servicers," it could be "significant." He later hedged on how big the systemic risk would be because the Fed's goal is to find institutions with big problems and help them avoid triggering systemic risks by "reserving more" and doing "capital preservation."
Real Money Is at Stake
Government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are both "aggressively" pursuing putbacks, Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency Edward DeMarco testified:
"During 2009, the Enterprises' lenders repurchased $8.7 billion of single-family mortgages, and slightly higher volumes are being repurchased in 2010. However, as of the end of the third quarter 2010, Fannie Mae had $7.7 billion in outstanding repurchase requests, and Freddie Mac had $5.6 billion in outstanding repurchase requests.
More than one-third of these repurchase requests have been outstanding for more than 90 days. Many of the lenders with aged, outstanding repurchase requests are among the largest financial institutions in the United States. . . . FHFA is examining its options should these requests not be resolved in the normal course of business."
Sounds like Fannie and Freddie are getting ready to sue. Nor have they made all the claims they hope to make. Last July, DeMarco said, the FHFA sent out 64 subpoenas seeking the information it would need to put back more securities. Nor are Fannie and Freddie the only investors looking to force banks to repurchase mortgage-backed securities. While such efforts face logistical hurdles, they are moving forward. Real money is at stake, after all: Some $7 trillion of mortgages are securitized.
"A Cloud of Uncertainty"
The Fed's Tarullo isn't the only regulator who believes buybacks pose a serious risk. The head of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, John Walsh, acknowledged "the systemic risk" posed by buybacks in his oral testimony. Similarly, Sheila Bair, the head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., testified that "the mortgage documentation problems cast a cloud of uncertainty over the ownership rights and obligations of mortgage borrowers and investors. Further, there are numerous private parties and government entities that may have significant claims against firms central to the mortgage markets. While we do not see immediate systemic risk, the clear potential is there."
Despite regulators' unanimity that investors' efforts to force banks to buy back mortgage securities pose major, potentially systemic risks, one witness rejected the idea that a big problem exists: Tom Deutsch, the executive director of the American Securitization Forum. More specifically, Deutsch dismissed concerns that securitizations had been fundamentally flawed such that mortgages never made it into the trusts that issued the mortgage-backed securities. He didn't address the idea that the loans in the securities were so lousy that investors could force the banks to buy them back on that basis.
Pushing back against concerns that the notes secured by the mortgages had not been properly endorsed and so had not been transferred into the trust, Deutsch cited a white paper put out by his group a couple of weeks ago, which was critiqued at the blog Credit Slips by Harvard Law Professor Adam Letvin. Deutsch responded directly to Letvin's critique, but in doing so assumed two "facts" that have been challenged recently.
First, Deutsch presumes the notes were delivered as required, although a recent bankruptcy case involving Bank of America (BAC) and anecdotal evidence suggest that didn't happen on a wide scale. Second, Deutsch presumes the notes were endorsed in a way he claims is proper. But again, the BofA case calls into question whether notes were endorsed at all.
Similarly, the foreclosure document problems exposed to date have included notes with mysteriously changing endorsements. In short, assuming Deutsch's arguments win the day, his testimony should reassure no one. At least not yet.
If the notes were never delivered, or never endorsed at all -- as a matter of routine practice, not just as isolated incidents -- Deutsch's arguments are irrelevant, all those securities aren't backed by mortgages and more buybacks are extremely likely.
The Mortgage Mess Poses Massive Risk
By ABIGAIL FIELD
Posted 4:45 PM 12/01/10 Columns, Economy, Investing, Real Estate
The Senate Banking Committee held its second hearing on problems in mortgage servicing today, and the news is grim.
One key focus of these panels was the risks posed to banks that sold mortgage-backed securities if investors in those securities were able to force the banks to buy them back (also called putbacks). That risk arises from two parallel scenarios that have been explained by the Congressional Oversight panel and elsewhere. The first is that the mortgages put into the securities didn't meet the level of quality that investors were promised. The second is that the securitizations themselves were faulty because the mortgages never got into the securities in the first place.
In his oral testimony, Federal Reserve Board Governor Daniel Tarullo wouldn't quantify the risk to banks posed by forced buybacks, but he said for at least some institutions, particularly "big servicers," it could be "significant." He later hedged on how big the systemic risk would be because the Fed's goal is to find institutions with big problems and help them avoid triggering systemic risks by "reserving more" and doing "capital preservation."
Real Money Is at Stake
Government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are both "aggressively" pursuing putbacks, Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency Edward DeMarco testified:
"During 2009, the Enterprises' lenders repurchased $8.7 billion of single-family mortgages, and slightly higher volumes are being repurchased in 2010. However, as of the end of the third quarter 2010, Fannie Mae had $7.7 billion in outstanding repurchase requests, and Freddie Mac had $5.6 billion in outstanding repurchase requests.
More than one-third of these repurchase requests have been outstanding for more than 90 days. Many of the lenders with aged, outstanding repurchase requests are among the largest financial institutions in the United States. . . . FHFA is examining its options should these requests not be resolved in the normal course of business."
Sounds like Fannie and Freddie are getting ready to sue. Nor have they made all the claims they hope to make. Last July, DeMarco said, the FHFA sent out 64 subpoenas seeking the information it would need to put back more securities. Nor are Fannie and Freddie the only investors looking to force banks to repurchase mortgage-backed securities. While such efforts face logistical hurdles, they are moving forward. Real money is at stake, after all: Some $7 trillion of mortgages are securitized.
"A Cloud of Uncertainty"
The Fed's Tarullo isn't the only regulator who believes buybacks pose a serious risk. The head of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, John Walsh, acknowledged "the systemic risk" posed by buybacks in his oral testimony. Similarly, Sheila Bair, the head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., testified that "the mortgage documentation problems cast a cloud of uncertainty over the ownership rights and obligations of mortgage borrowers and investors. Further, there are numerous private parties and government entities that may have significant claims against firms central to the mortgage markets. While we do not see immediate systemic risk, the clear potential is there."
Despite regulators' unanimity that investors' efforts to force banks to buy back mortgage securities pose major, potentially systemic risks, one witness rejected the idea that a big problem exists: Tom Deutsch, the executive director of the American Securitization Forum. More specifically, Deutsch dismissed concerns that securitizations had been fundamentally flawed such that mortgages never made it into the trusts that issued the mortgage-backed securities. He didn't address the idea that the loans in the securities were so lousy that investors could force the banks to buy them back on that basis.
Pushing back against concerns that the notes secured by the mortgages had not been properly endorsed and so had not been transferred into the trust, Deutsch cited a white paper put out by his group a couple of weeks ago, which was critiqued at the blog Credit Slips by Harvard Law Professor Adam Letvin. Deutsch responded directly to Letvin's critique, but in doing so assumed two "facts" that have been challenged recently.
First, Deutsch presumes the notes were delivered as required, although a recent bankruptcy case involving Bank of America (BAC) and anecdotal evidence suggest that didn't happen on a wide scale. Second, Deutsch presumes the notes were endorsed in a way he claims is proper. But again, the BofA case calls into question whether notes were endorsed at all.
Similarly, the foreclosure document problems exposed to date have included notes with mysteriously changing endorsements. In short, assuming Deutsch's arguments win the day, his testimony should reassure no one. At least not yet.
If the notes were never delivered, or never endorsed at all -- as a matter of routine practice, not just as isolated incidents -- Deutsch's arguments are irrelevant, all those securities aren't backed by mortgages and more buybacks are extremely likely.
Related articles
- Fed Examining Mortgage Put-Back Exposure of Banks (blogs.wsj.com)
- Fed's Tarullo: Housing Bubble 'Hangover' Still Very Much W/Us (forexlive.com)
- Regulators Scrutinize Mortgage Buy Backs (blogs.wsj.com)
- UPDATE 4-U.S. sees big costs for banks to fix foreclosures (reuters.com)
- Banks Fighting With Fannie, Freddie Over Soured Mortgages (huffingtonpost.com)
- Replacing Fannie Overseer May Limit Loan Putbacks, Rosner Says (businessweek.com)
- Fannie, Freddie Spar With Regulators on Foreclosures (businessweek.com)
- How Do I Know If My Mortgage Loan Is Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac? (thinkup.waldenu.edu)
- Analysis: Kitchen sink strategy dirties mortgage putback wars (reuters.com)
WELLS FARGO YOUR IDEAS SUCK. GO SIT IN THE CORNER, KEEP YOUR MOUTHS CLOSED AND LISTEN FOR A CHANGE.
Wells Plan Throws Risk Retention for a Loop
Friday, December 3, 2010
By Cheyenne Hopkins
As regulators try to collaborate on new securitization rules, a fissure has emerged in bankers' own thinking on the subject.
A united industry had lobbied Congress to exempt extra-safe loans from retention requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act. But an idea from Wells Fargo & Co. to limit that to loans with more money down has inflamed concerns that just a few large banks could enjoy the exemption.
"All other things being equal, a narrow definition will result in further consolidation in the mortgage marketplace to the benefit of large players and to the detriment of smaller lenders and consumers," said Karen Thomas, the senior executive vice president of government relations and public policy at the Independent Community Bankers of America.
Regulators have until spring to write rules enforcing a Dodd-Frank provision requiring lenders to retain at least 5% of loans they sell. The agencies also must establish the criteria for a "qualified residential mortgage," which could avoid the retention requirement and which Dodd-Frank left undefined.
Sources say the agencies are already divided over how restrictive the rule should be; a proposal initially expected in December is now targeted for a January release. But controversy over the Wells proposal poses an additional complication, observers said. In a Nov. 16 letter to regulators, the lender proposed that they use a narrow category for the exemption — such as just mortgages with a 70% loan-to-value ratio — saying an overly broad exemption would have unintended consequences.
"A definition of QRM that encompasses a large portion of the mortgage market … will produce a tendency to avoid lending to creditworthy borrowers falling outside that definition," wrote John P. Gibbons, an executive vice president at Wells Fargo Home Mortgage.
The proposal dominates industry buzz over the rulemaking, and Wells has remained a somewhat lone wolf. The biggest banks, which are more capable of making jumbo loans with whopping down payments, are presumed to stand to benefit from Wells' idea. But they have stayed mum on the topic. Meanwhile, some large banks and nonbank lenders, as well as trade groups like the American Bankers Association and National Association of Realtors, have distanced themselves from the idea.
"We believe there should be broad latitude to establish qualified mortgage exemptions and that it should be fairly liberal, and we are not in favor of excessive down payment requirements or any other term or condition," said Bob Davis, an executive vice president at the ABA.
Since Gibbons' proposal, others have released letters that, though not naming Wells, appeared to be rebuttals. (A Wells spokeswoman declined to comment.)
A joint letter Nov. 19 from three lenders argued that setting a narrow QRM definition would push most lending to Federal Housing Administration mortgages, which are also exempt from the risk-retention requirement.
"To the extent that the criteria are ratcheted up too tightly in the QRM, it will cause borrowers to fail to meet the QRM criteria, and they will be forced to move in large numbers to seek FHA loans," wrote Daniel Arrigoni, the president and CEO of U.S. Bancorp's U.S. Bank Home Mortgage; Sterling Edmunds Jr., the CEO of SunTrust Banks Inc.'s SunTrust Mortgage Inc., and William Emerson, the CEO of Quicken Loans Inc. "That will move a substantial amount of risk from the private sector to the government."
Ron Phipps, NAR's president, said in a Dec. 1 letter that a tightly defined QRM would result in reduced access to credit. "We fear that extensive additional requirements for QRMs would swing the pendulum too far and reduce the availability of affordable mortgage capital for otherwise qualified consumers," he wrote. "Many borrowers would simply be forced to pay much higher rates and fees for safe loans that nevertheless did not meet too narrow QRM criteria."
Stephen O'Connor, the vice president of government affairs at the Mortgage Bankers Association, said in an interview that a higher down payment requirement is not necessary if a loan has other positive features.
"If you have traditional products that are well documented and well underwritten, they should be exempt from risk retention because those are the very products you are trying to encourage for the marketplace," he said. "We think you can allow for a smaller down payment if there is some kind of credit enhancement, the most obvious being mortgage insurance. We don't think requiring a large down payment is appropriate."
Tom Deutsch, the executive director of the American Securitization Forum, also called for a more flexible QRM definition.
"The tighter the box around a QRM, the less loans available to those outside of that box, and the price of that credit will definitely be much higher," he said.
Wells' proposal has complicated an already uncertain regulatory environment for securitizers. Institutions have already been dealing with a recent regulation from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. that requires 5% risk retention — in addition to other measures — for securitized loans not subject to FDIC seizure in a bank failure. The agency has pledged that it will ease its rule to abide by the QRM definition, providing some hope for institutions.
But observers said the Wells proposal could make the retention requirements more restrictive than first expected for most of the industry.
"If you have a high down payment requirement, … then a couple of the large banks could portfolio those mortgages until the risk retention expires," said Jaret Seiberg, financial services policy analyst for MF Global's Washington Research Group. "We still believe we are going to end up with low down payment criteria if you have other credit enhancements to meet the qualified mortgage test. But there is a big push for this to be a lot more draconian of a test, and that's why there is so much [more] risk here than the market expected."
Julia Gordon, a senior policy counsel at the Center for Responsible Lending, said the Wells idea makes the rulemaking more complex.
"One hopes the rulemaking is not made based on industry lobbying, but realistically speaking, the regulators do take into account what the large banks say," she said.
Gordon said the exemption for qualified mortgages should not defeat the purpose of risk retention.
"What matters is [that] the concept of 'skin in the game' does not get watered down," she said.
Other observers said that, regardless of the outcome of the QRM test, the FHA is sure to be a winner since the loans it insures are already exempt in the law.
"As a result of that, this FHA will be the principal place for people with low credit scores where they can get credit," said Jeff Naimon, a partner in BuckleySandler LLP.
Friday, December 3, 2010
By Cheyenne Hopkins
As regulators try to collaborate on new securitization rules, a fissure has emerged in bankers' own thinking on the subject.
A united industry had lobbied Congress to exempt extra-safe loans from retention requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act. But an idea from Wells Fargo & Co. to limit that to loans with more money down has inflamed concerns that just a few large banks could enjoy the exemption.
"All other things being equal, a narrow definition will result in further consolidation in the mortgage marketplace to the benefit of large players and to the detriment of smaller lenders and consumers," said Karen Thomas, the senior executive vice president of government relations and public policy at the Independent Community Bankers of America.
Regulators have until spring to write rules enforcing a Dodd-Frank provision requiring lenders to retain at least 5% of loans they sell. The agencies also must establish the criteria for a "qualified residential mortgage," which could avoid the retention requirement and which Dodd-Frank left undefined.
Sources say the agencies are already divided over how restrictive the rule should be; a proposal initially expected in December is now targeted for a January release. But controversy over the Wells proposal poses an additional complication, observers said. In a Nov. 16 letter to regulators, the lender proposed that they use a narrow category for the exemption — such as just mortgages with a 70% loan-to-value ratio — saying an overly broad exemption would have unintended consequences.
"A definition of QRM that encompasses a large portion of the mortgage market … will produce a tendency to avoid lending to creditworthy borrowers falling outside that definition," wrote John P. Gibbons, an executive vice president at Wells Fargo Home Mortgage.
The proposal dominates industry buzz over the rulemaking, and Wells has remained a somewhat lone wolf. The biggest banks, which are more capable of making jumbo loans with whopping down payments, are presumed to stand to benefit from Wells' idea. But they have stayed mum on the topic. Meanwhile, some large banks and nonbank lenders, as well as trade groups like the American Bankers Association and National Association of Realtors, have distanced themselves from the idea.
"We believe there should be broad latitude to establish qualified mortgage exemptions and that it should be fairly liberal, and we are not in favor of excessive down payment requirements or any other term or condition," said Bob Davis, an executive vice president at the ABA.
Since Gibbons' proposal, others have released letters that, though not naming Wells, appeared to be rebuttals. (A Wells spokeswoman declined to comment.)
A joint letter Nov. 19 from three lenders argued that setting a narrow QRM definition would push most lending to Federal Housing Administration mortgages, which are also exempt from the risk-retention requirement.
"To the extent that the criteria are ratcheted up too tightly in the QRM, it will cause borrowers to fail to meet the QRM criteria, and they will be forced to move in large numbers to seek FHA loans," wrote Daniel Arrigoni, the president and CEO of U.S. Bancorp's U.S. Bank Home Mortgage; Sterling Edmunds Jr., the CEO of SunTrust Banks Inc.'s SunTrust Mortgage Inc., and William Emerson, the CEO of Quicken Loans Inc. "That will move a substantial amount of risk from the private sector to the government."
Ron Phipps, NAR's president, said in a Dec. 1 letter that a tightly defined QRM would result in reduced access to credit. "We fear that extensive additional requirements for QRMs would swing the pendulum too far and reduce the availability of affordable mortgage capital for otherwise qualified consumers," he wrote. "Many borrowers would simply be forced to pay much higher rates and fees for safe loans that nevertheless did not meet too narrow QRM criteria."
Stephen O'Connor, the vice president of government affairs at the Mortgage Bankers Association, said in an interview that a higher down payment requirement is not necessary if a loan has other positive features.
"If you have traditional products that are well documented and well underwritten, they should be exempt from risk retention because those are the very products you are trying to encourage for the marketplace," he said. "We think you can allow for a smaller down payment if there is some kind of credit enhancement, the most obvious being mortgage insurance. We don't think requiring a large down payment is appropriate."
Tom Deutsch, the executive director of the American Securitization Forum, also called for a more flexible QRM definition.
"The tighter the box around a QRM, the less loans available to those outside of that box, and the price of that credit will definitely be much higher," he said.
Wells' proposal has complicated an already uncertain regulatory environment for securitizers. Institutions have already been dealing with a recent regulation from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. that requires 5% risk retention — in addition to other measures — for securitized loans not subject to FDIC seizure in a bank failure. The agency has pledged that it will ease its rule to abide by the QRM definition, providing some hope for institutions.
But observers said the Wells proposal could make the retention requirements more restrictive than first expected for most of the industry.
"If you have a high down payment requirement, … then a couple of the large banks could portfolio those mortgages until the risk retention expires," said Jaret Seiberg, financial services policy analyst for MF Global's Washington Research Group. "We still believe we are going to end up with low down payment criteria if you have other credit enhancements to meet the qualified mortgage test. But there is a big push for this to be a lot more draconian of a test, and that's why there is so much [more] risk here than the market expected."
Julia Gordon, a senior policy counsel at the Center for Responsible Lending, said the Wells idea makes the rulemaking more complex.
"One hopes the rulemaking is not made based on industry lobbying, but realistically speaking, the regulators do take into account what the large banks say," she said.
Gordon said the exemption for qualified mortgages should not defeat the purpose of risk retention.
"What matters is [that] the concept of 'skin in the game' does not get watered down," she said.
Other observers said that, regardless of the outcome of the QRM test, the FHA is sure to be a winner since the loans it insures are already exempt in the law.
"As a result of that, this FHA will be the principal place for people with low credit scores where they can get credit," said Jeff Naimon, a partner in BuckleySandler LLP.
Related articles
- SEC Proposes Dodd-Frank Swap Dealer, Participant Definitions (businessweek.com)
- How to Calculate a Home Loan Payment (thinkup.waldenu.edu)
- Banks Tighten Mortgage Standards for FHA-Insured Loans (dailyfinance.com)
- Bank Regulators Agree: The Mortgage Mess Poses Massive Risk (dailyfinance.com)
- US mortgage rule could fix servicer conflicts -Bair (reuters.com)
- Mortgage Definition: Safe Mortgage (zillow.com)
- Should you give your kid a down payment? (money.cnn.com)
- Loan-Rule Spat: Define 'Safe' (online.wsj.com)
Thursday, December 2, 2010
MORTGAGE SERVICING FRAUD FORUM - GREAT PLACE TO FIND IMPORTANT INFORMATION
Mortgage Servicing Fraud Forum
I am not sure that homeowners are the people to be suing MERS; I think counties and cities should sue them for millions of $$$ in lost recording fee revenues. In this case, when government loses, we all lose (who do you think gets their taxes raised to make up the shortfall? Yep, ALL of us!)
Anyway, the outcome seems to in no way address the fact that MERS cloaks the true note holders throughout many sales of the note. MERS may be taking possession of the note in order to foreclose, but their shield will absolutely keep any homeowner from making progress in preforeclosure. MERS knows the owner, but evidently MERS doesn't tell the borrower; it waits until it can do the foreclosure itself. Yep, MERS discloses at signing that it is involved, but does anyone buying a first home know what that can mean later on when the stuff hits the fan? I doubt it.
A section of interest to all:
"When borrowers sign a mortgage contract naming MERS as the mortgagee, they are assigning their rights, title and interest in the property to MERS.
Promissory notes resulting from mortgages are recorded in real estate records. Most lenders sell the notes on the secondary mortgage market, often to government-sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae, which then resell the notes in the mortgage-backed securities market.
Since MERS remains the mortgagee of record, there are no additional recording fees each time the notes change hands. The fees are commonly $10 to $15 per transaction.
Arnold noted the electronic process eliminates the possibility of mistakes being made during paperwork processing." (Hahahahahaha; whew, let me wipe the tears from my eyes on this one)
A lot of counties are losing a lot of fees when these notes are sold. And a lot of cities and counties are cleaning and mowing properties without knowing where to send the bill for those services. Does MERS pay those bills?
Anyway, too bad the plaintiffs did not ask here; we could have suggested many additional complaints to add to their suit. MERS damages everyone, not just one or two borrowers.
On a brighter note, MERS volume is down. Maybe they will sink with the rest of the pond scum MERS calls "clients".
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1185883306599
Loading...
Nye Lavalle 08/01/07 at 12:05 PM Reply with quote #2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have thousands of houses that have been abandoned in our area which includes Buffalo and Niagara Falls. The demolition schedule is backed up for several years.
Our college grad people leave the area because the job market is so bad and that breaks up the family units and everybody that leaves, takes their taxes elsewhere and their votes elsewhere.
I don't see why hiding who the actual noteholder is, isn't criminal or else MERS should step up and pay the fees and bills from the city and county to maintain their abandoned houses.
I'm going to follow up with her in a few more weeks. I've tried to get other local reps to get interested but nothing and nada.
Buffalo can't manage their own finances and has a control board oversight.
I'm thinking any money they are not collecting because of MERS ought to be paid my MERS with penalties.
Otherwise, MERS should not be able to hide the noteholder and assist them from the noteholders responsibilities here and elsewhere.
I say forward the bills and if they are not paid, sue them for it.
Dee
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 01:26 AM Reply with quote #4
The case, by the way, was Trent et al v. MERS in United States District Court, Middle District, Jacksonville Division, Case No. "3.06-cv-00374-TJC-HTS". I have most of the pleadings in digital form.
It is important to remember to LEARN from our mistakes!
If anyone is litigating with MERS, they should be READING the pleadings and opinions in the key MERS cases.
Recent federal pleadings, motions and related filings are generally accessible via PACER (to registered users for a small fee):
https://pacer.login.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl?court_id=00idx
But I would be happy to SHARE copies of these pleadings with participants who are reciprocally HELPING OTHERS on this message board. I will RESERVE posting any critical commentary regarding the pleadings and the decision until AFTER any appeals are resolved and finally disposed of.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF ...
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML
Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 462 So. 2d 1178,. 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Here, MERS’s counsel explained to the trial judge at the hearing that, in ...
http://www.2dca.org/opinion/February%2021,%202007/2D05-4544.pdf
File Format: Unrecognized - View as HTML
Registration vs. Recording. MERS is not a system of legal record nor a replacement for the public land ... Status of foreclosing in MERS name in Florida. ...
http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id=63&table=DownloadFile - Similar pages
RULE 8
File Format: Unrecognized - View as HTML
(c) In the State of Florida, the authority to conduct ... (v) The Member shall report to MERS the initiation of foreclosure of any mortgage loan registered ...
http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id=360&table=ProductFile - Similar pages
"Registration vs. Recording. MERS is not a system of legal record nor a replacement for the public land records. Mortgages must be recorded in the county land records.
MERS is a tracking system. No interests are transferred on the MERS® System, only tracked."
From the Law.com document above:
"When borrowers sign a mortgage contract naming MERS as the mortgagee, they are assigning their rights, title and interest in the property to MERS."
These statements appear to be in direct opposition to each other, meaning that some judges may rule one way and some judges may rule another. Both judges thus may claim to be right.
There are people at this forum who can attest that multiple transfer recordings are NOT being done in the courthouses of this nation, leading to mass confusion for everybody. Only MERS knows by the end, and it doesn't tell.
Let's hear it for "MULTIPLE CHOICE LAW" where judges can make decisions according to their own interests or beliefs AND STILL BE RIGHT...Huzzah!
So much for appeals and all that. Everybody would be better served to check out where the financial interests of the judges lies. Judges often fail to disclose a conflict and recuse themselves when it would be proper for them to do so. Every state has a mechanism in place to obtain any judges financial statements, yet it is rarely used. Perhaps it is time for interested parties to do so. The results can be enlightening.
this one is good reading, It's hard to tell who won?
Miami Bankruptcy Law
Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc., 644 So.2d 515, 519-521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Constructive Fraud. Florida law recognizes an equitable cause of action for ...
miamibankruptcylaw.wordpress.com/ - 76k - Cached - Similar pages
You might want to check out MERS regarding predatory lending, Like v. MERS PREDATORY lending court dates.
No. 179: Matter of Merscorp, Inc. v Romaine In the MERS system, the mortgagor is notified of transfers of servicing .... from liability and further that it encourages predatory lending practices. ...
http://www.law.cornell.edu/nyctap/I06_0167.htm - 33k - Cached - Similar pages
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 01:09 PM Reply with quote #10
I want to call EVERYONE's particular attention to the item on PAGE 1 of the opinion in MERS v. Azize, Case No. 2D05-4544, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 2418; 32 Fla. L. Weekly D 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) posted by "O", above ( http://www.2dca.org/opinion/February%2021,%202007/2D05-4544.pdf ), which says:
"No appearance for Appellees."
I HAVE NEVER BEEN TO A BALL GAME WHERE A TEAM WON THE GAME WITHOUT EVEN SHOWING UP!
The MERS v. Azize case was LOST by DEFAULT after MERS SETTLED with those parties with the energy and resources to continue and then took a default appellate ruling against the rest! Bear in mind that a number of the cases on appeal in Azize were dismissed sua sponte by Judge Walt LOGAN. So some of these defendants had previously WON in District Court without showing up.
MERS SHOWED UP in force in this 2nd District Court, bringing with him amicus curiae briefs from FNMA, FHLMC, the MBA, Chase Home Finance and Countrywide. April CHARNEY filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the appellees, but the appellees did NOT APPEAR themselves.
There is one particularly important lesson to take from the Florida appellate cases. This is the NECESSITY of preparing well thought out and well argued pleadings and briefs in the trial court to ESTABLISH a good appellate record! Judge Walt LOGAN ruled sua sponte after witnessing ongoing egregious conduct by attorneys suing in MERS' name. But trial court judges do NOT show up at appellate arguments to defend their decisions.
While it is admirable that April CHARNEY and Jacksonville Area Legal Aid filed a brief, this is NOT an adequate substitution for the real party in interest APPEARING by counsel in an appellate setting.
But something else happened as a consequence of the Florida litigation. FNMA figured out that suing in MERS' name was legal quicksand and has now PROHIBITED the practice nationally for FNMA loans!
Nye Lavalle 08/02/07 at 01:17 PM Reply with quote #11
Fannie stopped [for then] after a special counsel was appointed due to my reports to the board of the ciminality occuring there. The special counsel agreed with me that the practices of th FLA foreclosure bar were major problems, wrong and perhaps criminal! FYI
However, what I have pushed for and will continue to push is for Fannie not to "approve" any firm, servicer, etc... that uses these practices, whether a Fannie loan or not!
Can't wait till these crooks finally get their accounting straight and hold an annual meeting which has not occured in MANY years.
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 01:18 PM Reply with quote #12
Also, BRAVO to ALL for moving back to a substantive discussion of the law and the issues. I DO think that when we post information we are readily able to SHARE, including appropriate commentary on past cases, that we are building a helpful resource for MSF victims!
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 01:28 PM Reply with quote #13
Nye:
Thank you for elevating this matter to FNMA's senior management! GOOD WORK! I am certain that you are correct that FNMA has a LOT of leverage with FNMA Seller/Servicers. I think that such pressure could be influential and even decisive with smaller lenders and servicers. But the very largest lenders and servicers are probably TOO BIG to be disciplined by FNMA alone.
I am inclined to think that in the end market discipline rather than regulatory discipline will prevail with respect to MERS.
That is, some really capable plaintiff's class action law firm is going to bring a successful RICO suit against MERS and then MERS' management will be CANNED! The firm is really thinly capitalized and will NOT be able to afford an adverse verdict.
But it appears to me that the class action suits brought to date have focused on the WRONG ISSUES.
By market discipline, I ALSO include suits by mortgage securities purchasers for breaches of covenants appearing within the registration statements for securities registered with the SEC and sold on Wall Street. When Wall Street turns on MERS, that firm is going to be stepped on like a very small insect!
As to regulatory discipline, MERS has enormous exposure on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) issue. But the UPL actions can be most successfully prosecuted by state bar associations or others vested with UPL enforcement responsibility.
Nye Lavalle 08/02/07 at 02:15 PM Reply with quote #14
There is a RICO suit against MERS, Fidelity and HSBC in the Southern District in New York. Can send you a copy of complaint if you like. Email me for it. Also, you have to understand that Wall Street CREATED MERS so it could hide the real parties in interest of the notes and avoid assignee liability.
Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch along with Fannie, Freddie, HSBC, First American, the title industry and many others are not only MEMBERS of MERS, BUT OWN MERS and the shares in MERSCORP!
As for the issues with illiterate members of this board, I have been here since the inception. They don't see the work I do since I chose long ago to help the masses rather than the asses. Like you so eloquently put it, I can't practice law and have to deal with competent counsel who can put up.
I don't know what some expect, but look at the posts on here as well as the docs I've provided for downloads and no one other than jack and I have done more for this cause since it's inception. To have morons come and attack those who try to help EVERYONE not just ONE person is a crime in itself!
I coined the terms predatory mortgage servicing and predatory mortgage securitization and variations thereof long before law professors, congress, regulators et al. used the terms [a google search will show how often used today]. The use of the terms [from a 1999 report I authored and presented to consumer law conference] is a CLEAR indication of who first exposed these crimes and who first brought to the attention of legal scholars etc.
In fact, in 2000, I was one of first to expose MERS and those at the annual NCLC conference didn't know what I was talking about. Judge Gordon in his questions to MERS in his sua sponte hearing uses Ms. Nye and Mrs. Pew [both me] and my posts on the website of MERS asking questions. I have a lengthy affidavit also prepared for MERS. Be more than happy to provide you with a telephone deposition as well as to my communications with MERS and their lawyers as well as executives including CEO and Gen Counsel.
We had a good Forbes article the other week as well you should use...
This is what I do to help as many as possible. Most of what we do is "stealth" and we only expose after public filing to help others.
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 03:00 PM Reply with quote #15
While I certainly do NOT disagree that Wall Street bears culpability in the creation of MERS, Wall Street is a term that includes a LOT of players with a LOT of interests. To the extent that BUYERS of mortgage securities find that they are LOSING money -- e.g. the subprime mortgage market meltdown -- class action attorneys for investors will seek to find a basis to ascribe responsibility to recover losses.
To a very large extent Wall Street exists to mediate flows of capital. There are sources of capital (e.g. pension funds) and uses of capital (e.g. corporate equity and debt markets, incuding venture capital, as well as the mortgage debt markets). As you well know, the mortgage debt markets are ENORMOUS.
While Wall Street may have found MERS to be a convenience when it served as a shield, obscuring ownership. Diverse interests on Wall Street will turn on MERS in an instant when looking for someone to BLAME for investment losses! I realize that these interests turning on MERS does nothing to directly help victims of MSF, but I believe that it WILL very quickly bring the MERS foreclosure mill to a CLOSE.
And here we part company somewhat as to our respective beliefs about the paradigm of MERS' operations. I think that MERS' core business as an electronic registration facility may have some merit as a legitimate business model. And I believe that MERS has been drawn into a criminal conspiracy to CONCEAL debt ownership and OBSTRUCT JUSTICE, by lending its name and delegating corporate authority to its members, while failing to properly SUPERVISE these members.
So while I see MERS as a participant in ongoing criminal activity, it appears to me that MERS COULD wake up, smell the coffee and get TOTALLY OUT OF THE FORECLOSURE BUSINESS. And I think that they almost certainly WILL do this within the next 24 months. The real question is whether management is going to do this voluntarily BEFORE further damage to the enterprise or whether in clinging to a FALSE and CRIMINAL business model, senior management is going to go DOWN WITH THE SHIP.
From what I peceive, you appear to view the MERS senior management as much more willing and aggressive partners in the criminal enterprise and seem to view the existence of this organization as for the PURPOSE of such criminal enterprise. (Pardon me if I am misinterpreting or misascribing your views. I am simply describing my own impressions garnered from your posts, etc. Please take no offense if I am mistaken.)
I may very well ultimately come around to your way of thinking if MERS continues to CLING to a business model that includes ongoing false representations to courts and perpetration of illegal activites! It is my impression that MERS is about to get nailed between the eyes by regulatory enforement activity, in addition to increasing and costly litigation. The actions of MERS within the next six to twelve months ought to show whether the criminal involvement is incidental or intentional!
Nye Lavalle 08/02/07 at 04:46 PM Reply with quote #16
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The whole key Bill is Transparency! No one wants it. MERS and the other opaque veils have been created to hide a system that in essence an unregulated and world-wide "Universal Reserve" and bank.
It's like the Fed, but in this new "Universal Reserve" it's a method of electronic digits. It is only when people or investors in recent weeks go to "cash out" the digits, when all hell breaks loose and you have "runs on the banks." Year ago you used to get a stock certificate that said you owed X shares in XYZ company. You used to have title insurance and a PUBLIC RECORD.
With no PUBLIC records and not stock certificates [yes virutally ALL stock companies are moving to NO paper] all ANYONE has is digits. Once assets are digitized, ANYONE can manipulate and there is no PAPER trail. The Wall St. firms are behind this "wealth extraction" method and have been playing it for years.
I can go on... but I think you get the idea. MERS was patterned after the Depository Trust Corp and CEDE & Co.. google both for some interesting info...
://login.dtcc.com/dtcorg/
I am not sure that homeowners are the people to be suing MERS; I think counties and cities should sue them for millions of $$$ in lost recording fee revenues. In this case, when government loses, we all lose (who do you think gets their taxes raised to make up the shortfall? Yep, ALL of us!)
Anyway, the outcome seems to in no way address the fact that MERS cloaks the true note holders throughout many sales of the note. MERS may be taking possession of the note in order to foreclose, but their shield will absolutely keep any homeowner from making progress in preforeclosure. MERS knows the owner, but evidently MERS doesn't tell the borrower; it waits until it can do the foreclosure itself. Yep, MERS discloses at signing that it is involved, but does anyone buying a first home know what that can mean later on when the stuff hits the fan? I doubt it.
A section of interest to all:
"When borrowers sign a mortgage contract naming MERS as the mortgagee, they are assigning their rights, title and interest in the property to MERS.
Promissory notes resulting from mortgages are recorded in real estate records. Most lenders sell the notes on the secondary mortgage market, often to government-sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae, which then resell the notes in the mortgage-backed securities market.
Since MERS remains the mortgagee of record, there are no additional recording fees each time the notes change hands. The fees are commonly $10 to $15 per transaction.
Arnold noted the electronic process eliminates the possibility of mistakes being made during paperwork processing." (Hahahahahaha; whew, let me wipe the tears from my eyes on this one)
A lot of counties are losing a lot of fees when these notes are sold. And a lot of cities and counties are cleaning and mowing properties without knowing where to send the bill for those services. Does MERS pay those bills?
Anyway, too bad the plaintiffs did not ask here; we could have suggested many additional complaints to add to their suit. MERS damages everyone, not just one or two borrowers.
On a brighter note, MERS volume is down. Maybe they will sink with the rest of the pond scum MERS calls "clients".
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1185883306599
Loading...
Nye Lavalle 08/01/07 at 12:05 PM Reply with quote #2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have thousands of houses that have been abandoned in our area which includes Buffalo and Niagara Falls. The demolition schedule is backed up for several years.
Our college grad people leave the area because the job market is so bad and that breaks up the family units and everybody that leaves, takes their taxes elsewhere and their votes elsewhere.
I don't see why hiding who the actual noteholder is, isn't criminal or else MERS should step up and pay the fees and bills from the city and county to maintain their abandoned houses.
I'm going to follow up with her in a few more weeks. I've tried to get other local reps to get interested but nothing and nada.
Buffalo can't manage their own finances and has a control board oversight.
I'm thinking any money they are not collecting because of MERS ought to be paid my MERS with penalties.
Otherwise, MERS should not be able to hide the noteholder and assist them from the noteholders responsibilities here and elsewhere.
I say forward the bills and if they are not paid, sue them for it.
Dee
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 01:26 AM Reply with quote #4
The case, by the way, was Trent et al v. MERS in United States District Court, Middle District, Jacksonville Division, Case No. "3.06-cv-00374-TJC-HTS". I have most of the pleadings in digital form.
It is important to remember to LEARN from our mistakes!
If anyone is litigating with MERS, they should be READING the pleadings and opinions in the key MERS cases.
Recent federal pleadings, motions and related filings are generally accessible via PACER (to registered users for a small fee):
https://pacer.login.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl?court_id=00idx
But I would be happy to SHARE copies of these pleadings with participants who are reciprocally HELPING OTHERS on this message board. I will RESERVE posting any critical commentary regarding the pleadings and the decision until AFTER any appeals are resolved and finally disposed of.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF ...
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML
Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 462 So. 2d 1178,. 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Here, MERS’s counsel explained to the trial judge at the hearing that, in ...
http://www.2dca.org/opinion/February%2021,%202007/2D05-4544.pdf
File Format: Unrecognized - View as HTML
Registration vs. Recording. MERS is not a system of legal record nor a replacement for the public land ... Status of foreclosing in MERS name in Florida. ...
http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id=63&table=DownloadFile - Similar pages
RULE 8
File Format: Unrecognized - View as HTML
(c) In the State of Florida, the authority to conduct ... (v) The Member shall report to MERS the initiation of foreclosure of any mortgage loan registered ...
http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id=360&table=ProductFile - Similar pages
"Registration vs. Recording. MERS is not a system of legal record nor a replacement for the public land records. Mortgages must be recorded in the county land records.
MERS is a tracking system. No interests are transferred on the MERS® System, only tracked."
From the Law.com document above:
"When borrowers sign a mortgage contract naming MERS as the mortgagee, they are assigning their rights, title and interest in the property to MERS."
These statements appear to be in direct opposition to each other, meaning that some judges may rule one way and some judges may rule another. Both judges thus may claim to be right.
There are people at this forum who can attest that multiple transfer recordings are NOT being done in the courthouses of this nation, leading to mass confusion for everybody. Only MERS knows by the end, and it doesn't tell.
Let's hear it for "MULTIPLE CHOICE LAW" where judges can make decisions according to their own interests or beliefs AND STILL BE RIGHT...Huzzah!
So much for appeals and all that. Everybody would be better served to check out where the financial interests of the judges lies. Judges often fail to disclose a conflict and recuse themselves when it would be proper for them to do so. Every state has a mechanism in place to obtain any judges financial statements, yet it is rarely used. Perhaps it is time for interested parties to do so. The results can be enlightening.
this one is good reading, It's hard to tell who won?
Miami Bankruptcy Law
Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc., 644 So.2d 515, 519-521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Constructive Fraud. Florida law recognizes an equitable cause of action for ...
miamibankruptcylaw.wordpress.com/ - 76k - Cached - Similar pages
You might want to check out MERS regarding predatory lending, Like v. MERS PREDATORY lending court dates.
No. 179: Matter of Merscorp, Inc. v Romaine In the MERS system, the mortgagor is notified of transfers of servicing .... from liability and further that it encourages predatory lending practices. ...
http://www.law.cornell.edu/nyctap/I06_0167.htm - 33k - Cached - Similar pages
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 01:09 PM Reply with quote #10
I want to call EVERYONE's particular attention to the item on PAGE 1 of the opinion in MERS v. Azize, Case No. 2D05-4544, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 2418; 32 Fla. L. Weekly D 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) posted by "O", above ( http://www.2dca.org/opinion/February%2021,%202007/2D05-4544.pdf ), which says:
"No appearance for Appellees."
I HAVE NEVER BEEN TO A BALL GAME WHERE A TEAM WON THE GAME WITHOUT EVEN SHOWING UP!
The MERS v. Azize case was LOST by DEFAULT after MERS SETTLED with those parties with the energy and resources to continue and then took a default appellate ruling against the rest! Bear in mind that a number of the cases on appeal in Azize were dismissed sua sponte by Judge Walt LOGAN. So some of these defendants had previously WON in District Court without showing up.
MERS SHOWED UP in force in this 2nd District Court, bringing with him amicus curiae briefs from FNMA, FHLMC, the MBA, Chase Home Finance and Countrywide. April CHARNEY filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the appellees, but the appellees did NOT APPEAR themselves.
There is one particularly important lesson to take from the Florida appellate cases. This is the NECESSITY of preparing well thought out and well argued pleadings and briefs in the trial court to ESTABLISH a good appellate record! Judge Walt LOGAN ruled sua sponte after witnessing ongoing egregious conduct by attorneys suing in MERS' name. But trial court judges do NOT show up at appellate arguments to defend their decisions.
While it is admirable that April CHARNEY and Jacksonville Area Legal Aid filed a brief, this is NOT an adequate substitution for the real party in interest APPEARING by counsel in an appellate setting.
But something else happened as a consequence of the Florida litigation. FNMA figured out that suing in MERS' name was legal quicksand and has now PROHIBITED the practice nationally for FNMA loans!
Nye Lavalle 08/02/07 at 01:17 PM Reply with quote #11
Fannie stopped [for then] after a special counsel was appointed due to my reports to the board of the ciminality occuring there. The special counsel agreed with me that the practices of th FLA foreclosure bar were major problems, wrong and perhaps criminal! FYI
However, what I have pushed for and will continue to push is for Fannie not to "approve" any firm, servicer, etc... that uses these practices, whether a Fannie loan or not!
Can't wait till these crooks finally get their accounting straight and hold an annual meeting which has not occured in MANY years.
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 01:18 PM Reply with quote #12
Also, BRAVO to ALL for moving back to a substantive discussion of the law and the issues. I DO think that when we post information we are readily able to SHARE, including appropriate commentary on past cases, that we are building a helpful resource for MSF victims!
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 01:28 PM Reply with quote #13
Nye:
Thank you for elevating this matter to FNMA's senior management! GOOD WORK! I am certain that you are correct that FNMA has a LOT of leverage with FNMA Seller/Servicers. I think that such pressure could be influential and even decisive with smaller lenders and servicers. But the very largest lenders and servicers are probably TOO BIG to be disciplined by FNMA alone.
I am inclined to think that in the end market discipline rather than regulatory discipline will prevail with respect to MERS.
That is, some really capable plaintiff's class action law firm is going to bring a successful RICO suit against MERS and then MERS' management will be CANNED! The firm is really thinly capitalized and will NOT be able to afford an adverse verdict.
But it appears to me that the class action suits brought to date have focused on the WRONG ISSUES.
By market discipline, I ALSO include suits by mortgage securities purchasers for breaches of covenants appearing within the registration statements for securities registered with the SEC and sold on Wall Street. When Wall Street turns on MERS, that firm is going to be stepped on like a very small insect!
As to regulatory discipline, MERS has enormous exposure on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) issue. But the UPL actions can be most successfully prosecuted by state bar associations or others vested with UPL enforcement responsibility.
Nye Lavalle 08/02/07 at 02:15 PM Reply with quote #14
There is a RICO suit against MERS, Fidelity and HSBC in the Southern District in New York. Can send you a copy of complaint if you like. Email me for it. Also, you have to understand that Wall Street CREATED MERS so it could hide the real parties in interest of the notes and avoid assignee liability.
Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch along with Fannie, Freddie, HSBC, First American, the title industry and many others are not only MEMBERS of MERS, BUT OWN MERS and the shares in MERSCORP!
As for the issues with illiterate members of this board, I have been here since the inception. They don't see the work I do since I chose long ago to help the masses rather than the asses. Like you so eloquently put it, I can't practice law and have to deal with competent counsel who can put up.
I don't know what some expect, but look at the posts on here as well as the docs I've provided for downloads and no one other than jack and I have done more for this cause since it's inception. To have morons come and attack those who try to help EVERYONE not just ONE person is a crime in itself!
I coined the terms predatory mortgage servicing and predatory mortgage securitization and variations thereof long before law professors, congress, regulators et al. used the terms [a google search will show how often used today]. The use of the terms [from a 1999 report I authored and presented to consumer law conference] is a CLEAR indication of who first exposed these crimes and who first brought to the attention of legal scholars etc.
In fact, in 2000, I was one of first to expose MERS and those at the annual NCLC conference didn't know what I was talking about. Judge Gordon in his questions to MERS in his sua sponte hearing uses Ms. Nye and Mrs. Pew [both me] and my posts on the website of MERS asking questions. I have a lengthy affidavit also prepared for MERS. Be more than happy to provide you with a telephone deposition as well as to my communications with MERS and their lawyers as well as executives including CEO and Gen Counsel.
We had a good Forbes article the other week as well you should use...
This is what I do to help as many as possible. Most of what we do is "stealth" and we only expose after public filing to help others.
William A. Roper, Jr. 08/02/07 at 03:00 PM Reply with quote #15
While I certainly do NOT disagree that Wall Street bears culpability in the creation of MERS, Wall Street is a term that includes a LOT of players with a LOT of interests. To the extent that BUYERS of mortgage securities find that they are LOSING money -- e.g. the subprime mortgage market meltdown -- class action attorneys for investors will seek to find a basis to ascribe responsibility to recover losses.
To a very large extent Wall Street exists to mediate flows of capital. There are sources of capital (e.g. pension funds) and uses of capital (e.g. corporate equity and debt markets, incuding venture capital, as well as the mortgage debt markets). As you well know, the mortgage debt markets are ENORMOUS.
While Wall Street may have found MERS to be a convenience when it served as a shield, obscuring ownership. Diverse interests on Wall Street will turn on MERS in an instant when looking for someone to BLAME for investment losses! I realize that these interests turning on MERS does nothing to directly help victims of MSF, but I believe that it WILL very quickly bring the MERS foreclosure mill to a CLOSE.
And here we part company somewhat as to our respective beliefs about the paradigm of MERS' operations. I think that MERS' core business as an electronic registration facility may have some merit as a legitimate business model. And I believe that MERS has been drawn into a criminal conspiracy to CONCEAL debt ownership and OBSTRUCT JUSTICE, by lending its name and delegating corporate authority to its members, while failing to properly SUPERVISE these members.
So while I see MERS as a participant in ongoing criminal activity, it appears to me that MERS COULD wake up, smell the coffee and get TOTALLY OUT OF THE FORECLOSURE BUSINESS. And I think that they almost certainly WILL do this within the next 24 months. The real question is whether management is going to do this voluntarily BEFORE further damage to the enterprise or whether in clinging to a FALSE and CRIMINAL business model, senior management is going to go DOWN WITH THE SHIP.
From what I peceive, you appear to view the MERS senior management as much more willing and aggressive partners in the criminal enterprise and seem to view the existence of this organization as for the PURPOSE of such criminal enterprise. (Pardon me if I am misinterpreting or misascribing your views. I am simply describing my own impressions garnered from your posts, etc. Please take no offense if I am mistaken.)
I may very well ultimately come around to your way of thinking if MERS continues to CLING to a business model that includes ongoing false representations to courts and perpetration of illegal activites! It is my impression that MERS is about to get nailed between the eyes by regulatory enforement activity, in addition to increasing and costly litigation. The actions of MERS within the next six to twelve months ought to show whether the criminal involvement is incidental or intentional!
Nye Lavalle 08/02/07 at 04:46 PM Reply with quote #16
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The whole key Bill is Transparency! No one wants it. MERS and the other opaque veils have been created to hide a system that in essence an unregulated and world-wide "Universal Reserve" and bank.
It's like the Fed, but in this new "Universal Reserve" it's a method of electronic digits. It is only when people or investors in recent weeks go to "cash out" the digits, when all hell breaks loose and you have "runs on the banks." Year ago you used to get a stock certificate that said you owed X shares in XYZ company. You used to have title insurance and a PUBLIC RECORD.
With no PUBLIC records and not stock certificates [yes virutally ALL stock companies are moving to NO paper] all ANYONE has is digits. Once assets are digitized, ANYONE can manipulate and there is no PAPER trail. The Wall St. firms are behind this "wealth extraction" method and have been playing it for years.
I can go on... but I think you get the idea. MERS was patterned after the Depository Trust Corp and CEDE & Co.. google both for some interesting info...
://login.dtcc.com/dtcorg/
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)